With no reconnaissance aircraft to warn of the oncoming Argentines, the Royal Navy was vulnerable. Because the British ships were unable to detect the incoming Exocets until the last moment, one missile hit the destroyer HMS Sheffield. Without exploding, the weapon opened a hole in the ship’s side. Fuel from the missile caught fire, and by the end of the day, the British warship sank.69

After this success, several other Argentine air force A-4 Skyhawks and Mirages assaulted the fleet, trying to disrupt British amphibious landings in San Carlos Sound. Although unsuccessful in their missions, these planes managed to damage two more ships.70

In the US Air Force’s new global engagement strategy, sea control must remain an important consideration.

During the war, the Etendards were Argentina’s most effective sea-control weapon. On 25 May, two of these planes flew northeast from their base and attacked the British ship Atlantic Conveyor. After one missile struck the vessel, a fire broke out and eventually, the ship sank.

Fortunately for the British, the Argentines had only four operable Etendards and very few Exocets. In total, they flew 12 sorties and launched five Exocets. Of these, only two missiles hit their targets. However, because of this threat, the British redeployed their aircraft carriers further eastward, away from the Falklands. Thus, to provide close air support, Harriers had to fly long distances.71

While most agree that the Falklands victory was the product of effective British sea power, a few scholars claim that if Argentina had properly planned its sea-control campaign and if it had had a few more antiship missiles, the results might have been different. One particular Falklands War study claims that the Argentines should have sent their Etendards against the British carriers:

Although they inflicted tremendous damage upon the British, the Argentines failed to strike successfully at Britain’s most vulnerable centers of gravity, its carriers. Destroying the carriers would not only have granted Argentina near total air superiority, it would have reversed the outcome of the war. A significant lesson of the air war over the Falklands is that sound operational planning is vital to the air superiority task as it is to all aspects of warfare.72

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The maritime lessons of the Falklands War were not lost on the Soviets or the Americans. In the Soviet navy digest Morskoy Sbornik, one admiral claimed that the British use of self-defense antiaircraft missiles and guns “turned out to be ineffective.” 73 In America, US Air Force chief of staff Gen Charles A. Gabriel claimed that the Falklands conflict demonstrated the importance of sea control. Therefore, he reported, “we will be putting more emphasis on such collateral roles as sea-lane protection, aerial minelaying and ship attack.”74 Earlier the US Air Force and US Navy had signed a memorandum of agreement that opened the way for arming B-52s with an antiship missile called the Harpoon.75

In 1984, B-52Gs began flying sea-control missions out of Loring AFB, Maine, and Andersen AFB, Guam. For the next several years, these squadrons participated in a variety of maritime exercises designed to test the sea-control mission. Along with planting mines, B-52s conducted simulated Harpoon missile attacks against a variety of ships. After 1989, however, both the Andersen and Loring squadrons were deactivated.76 Today, sea control is no longer a primary Air Force mission. Consequently, only a few B-52s flying out of Barksdale AFB, Louisiana, and Minot AFB, North Dakota, continue to train in maritime operations.

Although there are no current major naval threats, there are signs that indicate this is changing. A few experts believe Red China is in the process of adopting a forward Jinhai, or green-water, maritime strategy in which it plans to extend its control of the seas outward to over one thousand miles. This Pacific maritime frontier would extend from Vladivostok in the north to the Strait of Malacca in the south. One source estimates that by the year 2000, China will possess a fleet capable of conducting a green-water strategy, and “a blue-water capability is envisaged by the year 2020.”77

A recent Foreign Affairs article entitled “China: The Coming Conflict with America” claims that there are factors which could promote war between the two countries. One of these is Red China’s determination to acquire Taiwan. The Chinese have poured extensive money into their military and recently have embarked on a program of weapon modernization. They have acquired early-warning technology, 72 Russian-made Su-27 fighter-bombers, and Kilo-class submarines. Since 1994, on their own they have constructed “thirty-four modern war-ships.”78 In addition, noted another new source, there are signs that China may acquire “a naval version of the Russian-designated Su-27 for deployment aboard aircraft carriers.”79

Despite the questionable future of Red China’s maritime strength, one strategic fact remains constant: water covers approximately three-fifths of the globe. Thus, in the US Air Force’s new global engagement strategy, sea control must remain an important consideration.80 In the past, airpower was often successful. Among the spectrum of achievements, one of the more significant triumphs was the use of land-based airpower against ships.

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