Author: John L. Plaster

The title sounds like one of those titillating exposes on horrible things done by the US military during the Vietnam war by Peter Arnett, CNN and the usual stuff by that gang of anti military, establishment journalists. But it's not.

There are no stories here about commandos using nerve gas on the Vietnamese people as they lug bags of rice down the Ho Chi Minh trail on their backs. No stories about ruthless US Commanders sending out assassination squads to murder deserting or captured American soldiers in Cambodia. Nothing about evil commandos determined to "kill 'em all and let God sort 'em out." If one is looking for tender morsels to justify a viewpoint of the evil of US involvement in Vietnam, you won't find it here.

One of the few commando books to be first published in hardcover, SOG is an exceptionally well researched account of the Special Operations Group mission in Indochina, covert and otherwise. I rate it as one of the best books on the subject, as told from the summary viewpoint of the men in the field, their field officers and commanders. It is this three-way perspective that gives the book a certain uniqueness.

Many readers will recognize that US involvement in Vietnam began as early as the late 1950's (the official records of which remain classified) under the auspices of the CIA and William Colby, one of the top OSS operatives during WW II, and who later was to become the Director of Central Intelligence. If ever there were a man who knew how to run a covert war, it was Bill Colby, and while this book has nothing to do with the former DCI, it has everything to do with his philosophy on counterinsurgency.

SOG, originally named the Special Operations Group, was formed up exclusively of volunteers from SEALS, Green Berets, Rangers and Air Force Commandos, for political reasons SOG was given the hilarious official name of Studies and Observations Group. While observation was indeed a large part of it's role, the "study" was largely confined to methods to methods by which to harass and terrorize the enemy through covert operations.

SOG was the brainchild of no one, but the outgrowth of three presidential administrations and the CIA's desire for intelligence and the covert effort to counteract Communist insurgency into South Vietnam from obstenisbly neutral Laos and Cambodia. This, in the interest of "containing" the war within Vietnam's boundaries that it might not escallate into a widespread Indochina war.

A little known fact is that the Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos had its beginning all the way back in 1953 when the Viet Minh reestablished an old network of roadways to initiate attacks on the south. For political reasons, the Johnson Administration publicly ignored and downplayed this. Thus, the war had spread into these countries at least a decade before US troop deployment.

From Robert McNamara's infamous OPLAN 34A in December 1963, SOG recounts some of the more spectacular exploits of these behind the scenes commandos, up through the ill-fated ARVN operation Lam Son 729 in 1972, that last year of American troops in Vietnam. Included are the exploits of the legendary commando Jerry "Mad Dog" Shriver, so nicknamed not by his peers, but by Hanoi Radio who put a very high bounty on his head. Shriver served three years with SOG, the longest stint by any recon man during the war.

Typically Shriver:

It was Mad Dog Shriver who'd spoken the most famous rejoinder in SOG history: His team surrounded and Command concerned that [his team] might be overrun, a Forward Air Controller told Shriver, "It sounds pretty bad down there." And Shriver replied, "No, no, I've got them right where I want them -- surrounded from the inside."

SOG units had both major similarities and differences from the recon units that were later formed, units such as the Army LRRP's, Marine Force Recon units and many others. First and foremost was the fact that Special Operations Groups were not under the command of MACV and General Westmoreland, but rather the Pentagon and the Joint Chiefs themselves for covert security reasons.

For political reasons that today seem nothing if not bizarre, SOG groups were considered to be "illegal" and therefore conducted with the greatest of secrecy. This made them different to the extent that the restraints placed on the "official," MACV-designated (Military Assistance Command - Vietnam) recon teams did not exist for SOG. They were "go-anywhere, do anything" commandos with the dual role of recon and taking the battle to the enemy.

In the later regard, they performed much like the early SEAL missions -- before their free reign was curtailed -- where a major element of their role was sowing fear amongst the enemy operating over the borders. Unlike the large numbers of recon units that would follow, the SOG mission was offensive, facilitated in no small part by those inherently devious former OSS men who were to direct it's operations.

While the arguments continue to rage about which of the numerous recon units throughout the war conducted the greater exploits, none of the others were ever sanctioned to operate over Vietnam's borders, and none were officially (albeit covertly) sanctioned for offensive operations. SOG was, and this is what makes for some truly spectacular operations and one hell of a good read.

As Plaster points out, a mere 50 SOG Americans caused the NVA to devote three full divisions to guard the Ho Chi Minh trail, an economy of force ratio of 600:1, or one full battalion per SOG man. It was not a matter of how many enemy they could kill, but how many NVA could be tied up and taken out of offensive operations that mattered.

This is the essence of the SOG strategy, letting the enemy know that just because he was operating in Cambodia did not mean that he was going to be safe. The tiny six-man SOG teams would take every opportunity to attack and harass the enemy. From blowing up ammo dumps, laying booby traps and ambushes, to snatching messengers and officers off the trial, they did it all.

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Unlike many other recon books, SOG features fairly extensive background on the whys and wherefores of its operations. The lack of same is not a fault of similar books, but rather stems from the fact that other recon units were often kept out of the intel loop and in the dark by officers who used LRRP's in just about any way they saw fit.

Not subject to MACV command, SOG units were an integral part of the intel effort (what with the CIA being one of its parents), and as such were often given extensive background and intel briefings by their independent commanders. This increased SOG's performance immeasurably, and the lack of which was later to prove one of the primary causes of high mortality rates of other recon teams that were often sent out with no intel whatsoever.

SOG turns out to be quite a bit more scholarly than its catchy title might suggest. Despite being highly detailed, it remains eminently readable and decidedly engaging. There's enough adrenaline flowing here to keep any excitement junky turning the pages through the wee hours of the night. Most importantly, at least in my view, SOG does an excellent job in setting the stage for all the special force unit operations that follow. If you're interested in pursuing the many books on special forces operations, I'd recommend reading this one first.

The Secret Wars...
Onyx paperback, 1998
370 pages

Other Great Recon Books:

"Never Without Heros," Lawrence C. Vetter, Ivy Books, 1996, Paperback. Marine Third Recon Battalion in Vietnam, 1965-70. Another exceptionally well researched and written book based on hundreds of interviews by a veteran of that battalion. Small print in 338 pages covers dozens of ops mainly in Military Region One. I rate this book as one of the best on the subject of recon patrol action, tactics, battles and the conflicts between the reconners and their commanders. It sheds a lot of light on the concrete bound mentality of Marine leadership, without engaging in direct criticism.

While the Army pioneered air mobile Calvary with the Huey UH-1 helicopter, we discover here how the Marine attitude toward air mobility, its failure to keep pace with evolving tactics and equipment, and how its reliance on aging and unsuitable aircraft (Sea King, CH 46 & CH 53 helicopters) doomed hundreds, if not thousands of Marines to their deaths. We also discover why the Army had long ago stopped "prepping' their LZ's because it was like holding up a neon sign over the LZ saying, "here we are!" Yet the Marine command continued to maintain this preparation as standard doctrine.

"Six Silent Men," A three book trilogy on the 101 LRP/Rangers by Gary A. Linderer, Reynel Martinez, and Kenn Miller. Ivy Books, 1997, paperback. Each of the three books has a separate author although the material was researched and assembled by all three. Originally intending to write just one book, it became too long and was broken up into three books. The Army recon experience contrasted with that of SOG and the Marines, based strictly on personal accounts.

These are war stories at their finest, replete with all the trials and tribulations encountered from the enemy without, and the enemy within. While not particularly critical of US command, the authors are not shy in criticizing how both Washington and in-country Commanders pervert the recon function to roles the LRP's were not trained or intended to accomplish, such as combat support.

You'll also get a good look at the tremendous bond formed between the LRPs and their chopper pilots, and why so many of these officer pilots risked their lives time and again, displaying incredible feats of heroism. Good supporting background info and a generally easy and entertaining read.

"Good to Go," Harry Constance and Randall Fuerst, Avon Books, 1997, paperback, 412 pages. The personal experiences of a Navy SEAL in Vietnam. Dates are often one of the Achilles heels of military non-fiction. The authors know the time frames, but often forget that the reader wasn't there by his side. So it is with this book, which is one of its few flaws. Who Randal Fuerst, the co-author is, the book doesn't say, but presumably it is his ghost writer who does a pretty good job of putting the material in order.

The first hand accounts of missions and battles are most engaging, but I did feel that there is a bit too much of the author's personal history, particularly his trials and tribulations with his first wife. Even so, the book is well worth reading in order to gain a perspective on the SEAL method of recon, intel gathering, and taking it to the enemy. You can just skip over the man's personal problems.

Aside from the great descriptions of the action -- and some hair-raising stuff at that -- the SEAL method of operation was much different, and in my view, considerably more effective than the methods employed by other recon units. That's mainly because like the SOG's, the SEALs were briefly given free reign in their ops and methods.

It is also because these SEALs were trained in and took regional pacification doctrine seriously, quite unlike the Marines who made the big mistake of ignoring the role of the civilian. By the simple acts of befriending the locals and treating them with respect, these reconners were able to develop incredible flows of information.

Conversely, the Marine commanders viewed pacification as sissy stuff. Woe to the Marines that ignoring the sissy stuff meant that indifferent villagers became enemy villagers, that friendly villages became enemy strongholds that were ultimately the undoing of Marine General Lewis Walt, who fought McNamara's and Westmoreland's pacification programs every inch of the way.

In less than 18 months, the free reign of the SEALs was curtailed and the productivity of SEALs ops dropped off dramatically until their recon role was scrubbed altogether. Above all things, this book really sheds light on the potential of pacification, the failure of which is often blamed for the loss of the war.

"First Force Recon Company, Sunrise at Midnight," Dr. Bill Peters, Ivy Books, 1999, paperback, 238 pages. Another personal Marine account of the Recon experience primarily in the the DaNang area valleys such as Elepant and Happy valleys and Que Son Mountains. Concentrates solely on the recon experience and is a good and exciting read.