First Published in Australian Aviation, April and May, 1991, Issues. (c)1991, 1997, Carlo Kopp
Part 1: The Evolutionary Path
The rollout and first flights last year of the YF-22A
and YF-23A Advanced Tactical Fighter (ATF) demonstrator
aircraft represents another quantum leap in the evolution
of air superiority aircraft design.
Unlike earlier designs, the ATF is a
careful blend of advanced aerodynamics, propulsion and
electronics and involves a degree of system integration
never before attempted in a tactical aircraft. The reason
for this unprecedented effort is quite clear - the Russians
have finally deployed their equivalent to the teen series
fighters (see May, June 1990 AA), the Flanker and Fulcrum,
and have thus very rapidly closed the technological gap
which offered such favourable exchange rates for so long.
It is worth noting that the teen series fighters held the
high ground for well over a decade which is within itself
no mean feat, if we observe the history of fighter
development.
It is by turning back to the last two
decades of that history that we can fully understand the
evolution in tactical thinking that spawned the design
concepts now embodied in the ATF. It was in fact about
twenty two years ago that a pivotal point in the
development of air combat tactics was reached, and a new
outlook developed on the issue of air combat performance
parameters. The setting for this situation was more than
well publicised, as the USAF hammered the Third World
infrastructure of North Vietnam with weapons designed to
destroy industrialised economies. TAC flew daily raids with fast big and well armed
F-105D Thuds and F-4C/D Phantoms. The Thud was initially
designed for tactical nuclear strikes and thus sacrificed
manoeuvring ability for speed at low level, as such it had
no serious competitors in its class. Vietnam saw the Thuds
loaded up with 500 lb and 750 lb iron bombs flying low
level dive bombing raids on a range of targets, the Thuds
carried only an internal 20 mm gatling for self defence.
The Phantom in its C and D incarnations was
a minimal modification of the US Navy's established F-4B
fleet defence interceptor, the F-4 had a useful bomb
carrying ability but significantly served as the USAF's
principal air superiority aircraft. It was armed with
semi-active radar guided AIM-7D/E missiles, heatseeking
AIM-9B and AIM-4D missiles and in some instances, 20 mm
gatling centreline gunpods. Their opposition was a mixed
bag of second hand MiG-17F, MiG-19S/F-6 and MiG-21F
aircraft, armed with 23 mm and 30 mm guns and in some
instances, AA-2 Atoll heatseeking missiles. The aircraft
were flown by Vietnamese, Russian, Czech, Polish and East
German pilots, the latter not publicised for obvious
propaganda reasons.
The USAF did not fare very well, achieving
an air-air kill ratio of 2.18:1 in the period between 1965
and 1968. The reasons were manifold, as inadequacies in
missile performance, weapon systems and tactics combined
with absurd rules of engagement (ROE) offered every
imaginable advantage to the Communists, who did not
hesitate to exploit them. What had become very apparent was
that the performance characteristics of the aircraft and
weapons used were ill matched for the kind of engagements
which were entered. The MiGs were light VFR only fighters
with simple gyro stabilised gunsights and no fire control
worth mentioning, the 17 and 19 being both optimised for
climb performance at high subsonic speeds. This gave them
good turning ability and respectable subsonic acceleration
which combined well to provide the basic elements of good
gunfighting air combat performance.
The Phantoms were IFR supersonic
interceptors, with air intercept radar, two man crew,
beyond visual range (BVR) radar guided missiles and tail
aspect only heatseeking missiles, both types optimised for
killing high flying bombers. The missiles lacked the
manoeuvre performance to successfully kill a nimble and
small target unless launch conditions were optimal and the
target's manoeuvre options were highly restricted. The
Phantom's advantage in transonic acceleration and climb
performance was balanced by high wing loading and
unspectacular turning performance.
The USAF was clearly unhappy about this
situation and measures were sought to improve kill ratios.
The demand for a gun and better turn performance spawned
the F-4E with a stretched fuselage, improved fuel capacity,
chin mounted M61 20 mm gatling gun and manoeuvring slats.
The same pressures also led to a major review of air-air
tactics which saw the adoption of energy manoeuvrability as
a fundamental of the new air combat manoeuvring doctrine.
Conceived by a serving USAF fighter pilot, Major John Boyd,
energy manoeuvrability revolved about the use of an
aircraft's energy state (ie speed/altitude) to gain a
positional advantage in a manoeuvring engagement, thus
gaining a firing opportunity.
Because the close-in air-air weapons of the
period were guns and tail aspect heatseekers, the best
firing opportunities resulted from tail aspect shots, this
in turn dictated that an aircraft must possess superior
sustained turning, acceleration and climb performance to
defeat an opponent. While the F-4 had the acceleration and
climb performance to kill most current opponents, it was
clear that the next generation of fighters had to possess
even greater thrust/weight ratios and much better sustained
turning performance. The latter was simply not achievable
by modifications to existing types which had their origins
in the late fifties and hence were aerodynamically highly
optimised to strike or interception roles.
The USAF initiated its FX program, while
the USN discarded its troubled F-111B bomber turned
interceptor in favour of the new VFX. Both the VFX and FX
exploited new propulsion technology, discarding
afterburning turbojets in favour of afterburning turbofans
which offered much better specific fuel consumption in dry
thrust and a higher ratio of afterburning thrust to dry
thrust. Experience in Vietnam clearly indicated that the
endurance/combat radius of the 400 NM class F-4 was
inadequate and hence the VFX and FX were designed to a 1000
NM class combat radius. Climb and turn performance dictated
low wing loading and good AoA performance this in turn
shaping the wing and inlet designs.
First to fly was Grumman's VFX, designated
the F-14A, a large twin with swing wings and a pair of
TF-30 fans. The F-14A had a large bubble canopy for good
visibility during dogfights, a Head Up Display (HUD)
gunsight, computer controlled automatic wing sweep and
glove vane positioning, a massive AWG-9 pulse Doppler air
intercept/fire control radar system capable of tracking
multiple targets in ground clutter and an internal M-61
gun. It was bigger, more complex and more expensive than
the F-4, but it also offered agility and manoeuvrability
without precedent. The first of the teen series fighters
had thus made its mark.
The 20,000 lb class TF30-P414 powerplants
fitted to the F-14A were a stop gap measure which offered a
1:1 class thrust/weight but not the stunning 1.2+ class
thrust/weight sought by the Navy, that was to occur with
the F-14B which was to be fitted with F401-P-400s,
navalised derivatives of the emerging Pratt&Whitney FX
powerplant. For budgetary reasons this never eventuated,
the F-14A having to wait until the nineties for the 30,000
lb class F-110-GE-400 powerplant.
The USAF's FX subsequently flew in 1972,
taking advantage of the 25,000 lb class F100-PW-100
powerplants and optimised for energy manoeuvrability. Like
the F-14 it had a large bubble canopy, HUD, powerful pulse
Doppler fire control radar, low wing loading and internal
gun. Because it was smaller and lighter than the F-14A, it
offered a stunning 1.4:1 class thrust/weight ratio and thus
set the standard for air combat fighters (see AA Sept/Nov
84).
By the mid seventies the F-14A and F-15A
entered service and quickly established their superiority
over existing aircraft. Cost of ownership had however
proven to be a major issue as both aircraft cost much more
to buy and even more to maintain, given their more complex
powerplants and avionic systems. Under pressure from
legislators, the USAF initiated the Light Weight Fighter
(LWF) program to supplement the F-15 with a smaller and
much cheaper VFR dogfighter, an aircraft armed with guns
and heatseeking missiles and equipped with a small pulse
Doppler radar optimised for dogfighting alone.
Northrop bid their YF-17, a derivative of
their P-530 lightweight fighter, while General Dynamics bid
their YF-16, derived from a fly-by-wire relaxed static
stability technology demonstrator. The YF-17 Cobra was a
small twin with two 'leaky turbojet' YJ101-GE-100
powerplants and a hybrid planform comprised of massive
Leading Edge Extension (LEX) strakes and a moderately swept
wing. The YF-16 was fitted with a single F100 common to the
F-15 and employed extensive wing/body blending, also using
strakes and a moderately swept wing. The YF-16 was the
first aircraft ever built to be statically unstable and
relied upon a triple redundant analogue computer system to
remain flyable.
The LWF flyoff was won by the YF-16 due in
no small measure to its powerplant commonality with the
F-15, and to its smaller size and somewhat better
thrust/weight ratio performance. Subsequently selected as
the standard NATO air superiority fighter, the F-16 is
today one of the mainstays of Western air power.
Like the USAF the Navy came under
increasing budgetary pressure from legislators, who quickly
quashed the Navy's plans for a fleet of supercarriers
equipped with a force of air superiority F-14Bs and strike
F-14Cs, the latter a strike fighter derivative of the F-14B
intended to replace the underpowered A-6 bomber. The Navy
were directed to select one of the two USAF LWF contenders
under the Naval Air Combat Fighter (NACF) program, the
intention being being to replace the ageing A-4, A-7 and
F-4 fleets with a single dual role lightweight fighter
bomber. Many in the US Navy opposed this move, which
largely defeated the Navy's strategy of acquiring a 1000 NM
radius air superiority/strike force.
The Navy eventually selected the F/A-18A, a
substantial redesign of the YF-17 airframe with greater
internal fuel capacity, bigger 16,000 lb class F404 engines
and BVR missile capability, absent on the smaller F-16. The
F/A-18A was designed to rigid reliability and
maintainability specifications, which substantially
increased the cost of the aircraft, which by then had
acquired a very sophisticated suite of avionic systems,
imposed largely by the need for one airframe to fulfill two
diverse roles. Another side effect of this program was the
'detuning' of the F404 powerplant's performance to improve
reliability and lifetime.
The F/A-18A also employed fly-by-wire, but
employed a sophisticated quadruplex digital system where
software changes could be employed to 'tweak' handling
characteristics. The avionic system was built around
multiply redundant serial Mil-Std-1553B databusses and
employed dual redundant digital computers.
With the entry into service of the F/A-18A
the US services completed their reequipping with teen
series fighters, eventually building up a force of several
thousand aircraft of these four basic types.
The basic philosophy of high thrust/weight
ratio and sustained turning performance in transonic
dogfights shaped these aircraft aerodynamically and hence
imposed fundamental constraints to the other performance
characteristics of this family of aircraft.
Evolution did not stand still however, and
the early eighties saw the deployment of one of the most
significant air combat weapons of its time - the all aspect
heatseeking Lima model of the established AIM-9 Sidewinder
missile. The AIM-9L did not require a tail chase position
to lock on to a tailpipe, it was quite happy to lock on
from any angle including 12 o'clock ie head-on. Soon after
deployment the AIM-9L proved that much of the air combat
tactics textbook had been obsoleted, in that instantaneous
turning performance became far more important than
sustained turning performance. The ability to point the
nose at an opponent quickly and loose off a missile became
far more important than the ability to follow through
multiple turning manoeuvres to acquire a tail aspect
gun/heatseeker firing position. While a tail aspect
position did improve the kill probability of the missile by
reducing the target's evasive manoeuvre options, the
AIM-9L's all aspect performance was still superb, as
learned the hard way by the Argentine and Syrian air forces
in 1982.
Clearly the day of the classical dogfight
was almost over, in that the first aircraft to acquire its
opponent would be first to fire and most likely to win the
engagement. Only if the first firing opportunity were to
fail and the combatants were to pass each other and then
engage in a turning dogfight, was there a major requirement
for sustained turning performance. Yet again, however, the
all aspect capability of the AIM-9L would convert fleeting
nose on target opportunities into real firing
opportunities.
The first aircraft to take advantage of
this situation was the Navy F/A-18A, which had its flight
control software tweaked up to optimise instantaneous turn
performance, this combined with its sophisticated HUD and
fire control radar dispelled any doubts of the aircraft's
lethality, given earlier criticism of its low (ie 1.1:1 !)
combat thrust/weight ratio. Acceleration and climb
performance, and low energy bleed in manoeuvring at
transonic speeds were the key parameters in this class of
engagement.
A new philosophy for air combat tactics was
thus developed by the USAF, who envisaged long range medium
to high altitude penetration of hostile airspace by
supersonic cruise capable fighters with all aspect fire and
forget missile armament. A key element in the new strategy
was the AIM-120 Amraam missile (AA Sept 86), an active
radar guided intelligent fire and forget BVR missile,
designed to replace the established semi-active radar
guided AIM-7. Coupled with a suitable fire control radar
the AIM-120 allows a single fighter to salvo up to eight
rounds at eight separate inbound targets within the
acquisition geometry of the fire control radar.
Manoeuvring at sustained supersonic speeds,
the new look air superiority fighter could outmanoeuvre
SAMs and most AAMs, while always retaining an energy
advantage over the subsonic/transonic speed range optimised
teen series turning dogfighter. The aerodynamic and
propulsion design compromises which supported sustained
turning performance at high subsonic and transonic speeds
seldom improved the ability of the aircraft to sustain high
energy manoeuvres at Mach 1.5 class speeds, where much of
the wing was enveloped in the shock cone produced by the
nose of the aircraft.
The philosophy of first-look first-shoot
reflected in the need for superior sensor capability and
low observability ie Stealth. The former and latter
requirements result in the need for a frequency/spatially
agile radar and high performance InfraRed Search &
Track (IRST), while the latter requirement imposes the need
for all of the tricks of the Stealth trade, ie shaping,
skinning and detailing.
The first aircraft to fly which embodied
some of the new technology was the ill-fated F-16XL. A
radical redesign of the F-16A, the XL was a supersonic
cruise demonstrator with a cranked arrow delta wing
optimised for that flight regime. The aircraft was, on the
strength of published reports, a major technical success,
with two demonstrators eventually flying. The highly swept
inboard wing section of this aircraft produced substantial
vortex lift at supersonic speeds, while also improving
instantaneous turn rate and extending the 9G manoeuvre
envelope well above Mach 1. An additional benefit of the
new configuration was a substantial increase in internal
fuel capacity, providing a 120% improvement in combat
radius performance.
The F-16XL suffered the fate of many
pioneering aircraft before their time, its F-16E dual role
strike fighter derivative lost out in a flyoff against
MDC's bigger and more capable F-15E Strike Eagle, thus
ending all prospects for its eventual production. Many
observers attributed its demise to a political strategy
played by the USAF, to prevent an older generation airframe
derivative from being used by legislators as an excuse to
kill off or postpone the ATF program. Equipped with Amraam,
higher thrust engines and new radar, the F-16XL could cover
a large part of the role envisaged for the ATF at
substantially lower unit and program costs. As an older
generation airframe however its infrared and radar
signatures are substantial and this would greatly reduce
its effectiveness (although trivia of this nature hardly
ever bother astute decisionmakers such as politicians...).
The ATF program had its origins in numerous
USAF air combat studies carried out in the late seventies
and early eighties, when intelligence information revealed
the Soviets' early flight testing of the Fulcrum and
Flanker. From the observed geometry of the airframes it was
clear that both types would have the vortex lift
performance to challenge the teen series aircraft in
turning dogfights, by the same token both Soviet fighters
would be handicapped by their geometry in both supersonic
manoeuvre and low observability performance.
The ATF was to be the successor to the
F-15, a long range air superiority fighter with the
performance to kill any other tactical aircraft and the
operating radius to threaten targets deep inside the USSR
while flying from bases in Western Europe. This was to be
achieved by the use of a highly integrated
airframe/systems/propulsion design exploiting advanced
aerodynamics, engines and stealth technology, the latter to
delay an opponent's initial firing opportunity for as long
as possible, and thus capitalise on the large Radar Cross
section (RCS) of the Fulcrum and Flanker.
Subsequent to studies, an RFP was issued in
July 1986, and two contractor teams,
Northrop/McDonnell-Douglas and Lockheed/Boeing/General
Dynamics were selected in October 1986 for the initial 50
month demonstration/validation phase flyoff. The rollout of
the prototypes was initially scheduled for mid 1989, but
ongoing slippages have delayed this until the middle of
last year.
Part 2 provides
a technical comparison of the YF-22A and YF-23A prototypes.
Watch for Part 2 on Friday.
F-4B Phantom
MDC F-4B Phantom II. The F-4 was the mainstay of the USN's
and USAF's tactical fighter force in the SouthEast Asian
conflict. The Phantom offered superb acceleration and climb
performance for its day, while carrying an impressive
air-air payload of 4 heatseeking AIM-9D and 4 semi-active
radar AIM-7E missiles. In engagements with the smaller and
nimbler NVAF MiGs the F-4 was hampered by poor missile
performance and reliability, inadequate radar lookdown
performance and the absence of a gun for close in
engagements.
F-14A Tomcat
Grumman F-14A Tomcat. Grumman's large F-14 fighter was the
first of the teen series aircraft to fly and deploy. It was
equipped with a pair of 20,000 lb class TF-30 afterburning
fans and a computer controlled variable geometry wing to
provide superb turning and acceleration performance, while
its massive pulse Doppler AWG-9 fire control radar and Head
Up display allowed the targeting of 100 NM class AIM-54
Phoenix missiles, AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles
and an internal M-61A1 20 mm gun. It has remained a
formidable dogfighter to this day.
F-15A Eagle
MDC F-15A Eagle. The F-15A was designed, like the F-14A,
for high thrust/weight ratio to provide superlative
acceleration, climb and turn performance. Like the F-14, it
is equipped with a high power long range lookdown/shootdown
pulse Doppler radar. Armed with a mix of AIM-7 and AIM-9
missiles and an internal M-61 gun, the F-15 has repeatedly
demonstrated its capability in the Middle East. The most
recent subtype, the dual role strike fighter F-15E, is
structurally strengthened for 9G manoeuvres.
F-16A Falcon
Dubbed the 'Electric Jet', GD's F-16 was the first tactical
aircraft to employed relaxed static stability and
fly-by-wire control. Initially acquired as a low cost VFR
dogfighter armed with an internal M-61 gun and heatseeking
AIM-9 missiles, the later F-16C is a truly multirole
tactical aircraft, with wide angle holographic HUD, and
provision for Lantirn terrain following radar/FLIR pods and
the AIM-120 Amraam BVR missile.
F-16XL
The F-16XL was a supercruise technology demonstrator
derived from the basic F-16 airframe/powerplant. The
cranked arrow delta wing allowed the aircraft to cruise
supersonically on dry thrust, improved the manoeuvre
envelope substantially while providing enough additional
internal fuel capacity to increase the combat radius by
120%. Sadly it never entered production, losing to the
F-15E in a competitive flyoff for the Dual Role Fighter
program. As a teen series airframe lacking stealth
capability, it cannot compete with the newer ATF aircraft.
F-18A
Using a hybrid planform wing and digital fly-by-wire, the
MDC F/A-18A was the last of the teen series fighters. It
was the first tactical aircraft to employ a fully digital
Mil-Std-1553B bussed avionic system under the control of
redundant digital computers. A multirole derivative of the
YF-17 airframe, the later F/A-18 is a fully capable all
weather strike fighter which retains excellent air
superiority performance.
Flanker
The Su-27 Flanker is the most capable aircraft in the
Russian inventory and is expected to be a hot seller in the
Third World market (Above is the aircraft in Chinese livery
with R-77 Adder radar guided missile and R-73 IR missile
below). Aerodynamically it reflects the design philosophy
of the teen series aircraft, employing vortex lift, high
thrust/weight ratio and fly-by-wire control. Equipped with
a large pulse Doppler radar, internal 30 mm gun, BVR and
heatseeking missiles, it is a formidable opponent. Recently
tested on the V-MF's new CVAN, the Flanker has the combat
radius and performance to contest any teen series aircraft.