by Lt. General Harold G. Moore and Joseph L. Galloway
As any student of the Vietnam war soon learns, there are two
basic types of books about the war: political tomes and your
basic war story.
First published in 1992, We Were Soldiers Once . . . became
the rare Vietnam war story to ever become a New York Times
best seller. Its a collaboration between then Colonel Hal
Moore and UPI journalist Joe Galloway, Moore the commanding
officer, and Galloway the reporter who was present every
step of the way during that fateful two weeks in early
November, 1965.
Known as the battle of Ia Drang, it take's name from the
river valley near the Cambodian border south of Plei Ku in
the Central Highlands. At the heart of the Ia Drang battle
lies the introduction of the helicopter into ground
warfare, the now famous UH-1 "Huey" and the CH-47 Chinook.
The result of the vision of Lt. General John Gavin
expressed in his 1957 essay "Calvary -- and I Don't Mean
Horses, the 11th Air Assault Division was born at Ft.
Benning, Georgia in 1963. Ia Drang marks the first
full-scale battle test of air cavalry.
The words of Lt. General Hal More, the commanding officer
at Ia Drang, offers one view on how well that test succeed:
"There is no doubt in the mind of any of my men but that
for the helicopter, we'd all be dead." Yet these successes
were not quite what they were claimed to be, as the
remaining war years were to see the loss of over 6,000
helicopters and 4300 pilots, numbers that make the loss of
B-17 bombers over Germany seem small in comparison.
Lyndon Johnson, having acquired Vietnam from the ambitious
foreign policy of the recently assassinated John Kennedy,
in the face of upcoming elections, and eager to make a
decisive stand against the NVA, is not about to step back
from Kennedy's disastrous mistake. Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara seizes on the recently developed concept of
air mobility, Johnson backs him, and the U.S. Army is
launched into an 8 year escalation of defensive warfare.
At the same time, and setting the stage for Ia Drang, are
Hanoi's military planners who envision a classic
conventional campaign to crush the Army of the Republic of
Vietnam in October 1965. They would lay siege to the
American Special Forces camp at Plei Me, consisting of a
mere 12 U.S. advisors and several hundred Montagnard
mercenaries. This was one of the few conventional warfare
attacks launched by the NVA until Tet 1968.
Ia Drang was a response to the nearly successful October,
1965 attack on Plei Me, which was thwarted when the U.S.
unexpectedly brought in U.S. troops as reinforcements.
After the Plei Me attack, the North Vietnamese regular army
retreated to the Chu Pong massif (mountain). Col Hal More
was ordered to find and engage the enemy, having only a
vague notion of where they were.
The authors write:"One month of maneuver, attack, retreat,
bait, trap, ambush and bloody butchery in the Ia Drang . .
. .was the Vietnam War's true dawn -- a time when two
opposing armies took the measure of each other." And:
"The North Vietnamese commanders had a deep-rooted fear
that the lessons they had learned (fighting the French) had
been outmoded by the high-tech weaponry and revolutionary
air mobile helicopter tactics that the Americans were
trying out on them."
More of an air assault probe into the Ia Drang river valley
to locate the withdrawn enemy, Moore had little idea of
what was waiting for him. Unbeknownst to him, the 1st of
the 7th Cavalry choppers set them down right smack at the
base of the mountain, on which some 6,000 North Vietnamese
regulars were massed, at what is now the famous LZ X-Ray.
"There was that big red star on the intelligence map, which
indicated that the biggest target of all was way out west,"
Moore recalls, meaning beyond the Laotian border. That
intelligence was, of course, wrong. What follows is one of
the more incredible battles of the Vietnam war. Though cut
to ribbons with 300+ casualties, and fighting against 10:1
odds in an ambush, the enemy was defeated.
Wounded waiting at LZ XRay for a Huey ride out.
The story is skillfully woven with a mix of first hand
accounts from Moore and Galloway, as well as dozens of
grunts and officers. Galloway, no elitist, shrinking violet
journalist, is a 23 year old Texan who totes an M16 and
later mans a 30 cal machine gun, offers up one of
journalism's finer moments. Each contributor injects a
little of themselves into the story, yielding a unique
format.
This book is as worthy of its account of an incredible
battle, as it is for the no-nonsense, matter-of-fact way
that it is told. Electrifying and horrifying at once,
there's not a bit of hyperbole here. You get the sense that
the story is told only hours after the battle, by troops
still in shock, in voices as flat as the thousand yard
stare.
In all the 'Nam stories I've read, none has ever been told
better. Its not merely Galloway's literary skills that rise
to the surface, but a wisdom and temperament that preceded
his assignment. While heroics abound, its the writer's
matter-of-fact presentation that stands proud here. Nor is
there any lack of appreciation for the skill of the enemy,
the mark of a commander (Moore) who doesn't make the
mistake of underestimating his adversary.
Like all good war stories, its more than a story about war.
It covers the gamut from strategy and tactics to the
intensely personal and human cost of war. No one-sided
tale, the depth of this effort is apparent by the
presentation of the other side through numerous interviews
of the NVA officers, who present us with their thinking and
strategy. A rare account indeed. Its even more remarkable
when we discover that Joe Galloway and the two commanding
officers, Hal Moore and Nguyen Giap, actually met in Hanoi
in 1990 to discuss and compare their accounts of Ia Drang.
You find it hard to believe until you see a picture of the
three of them together.
Though told in a somewhat militaristic style, it doesn't
get bogged down with the sort of military jingoism that
ruins so many war stories for the uninitiated. Unlike a
Dale Brown novel, where one about wants to strangle the
author for the injudicious use of meaningless acronyms and
military jargon that only a veteran of that service could
understand, about the only difficulty you'll have here is
keeping the various companies and regiments straight. UPI
reporter Joe Galloway sees to it that the names, places and
actions are comprehensible for the common reader as words
can make it, even in a battle that takes place over two
weeks and four Landing Zones.
A sub theme revolves around the introduction and first
successful use of Air Assault (aka air modility) with the
now famous (or infamous) UH-1 Huey helicopter. Here we see
why the grunts developed a love/hate relationship with the
aircraft that carried them into death's way, as well as
rescued them from it.
Tactically and strategically, this battle was a disaster,
for though both sides ultimately claimed victory -- the
North Vietnamese Army with a casualty rate of at least 10:1
-- the NVA lost their fear of the helicopter and developed
the techniques to defeat it at the moment of its
introduction. Though the battle of LZ X-Ray might well be
called a success, what happened immediately afterward was
an unmitigated disaster. As two reinforcing battalions
depart the LZ, they make the mistake of allowing themselves
to become strung out in a long column, without
communications, to be chopped to pieces by the NVA once
again swarming down off the mountain, stringing the story
out longer than it should have been.
Whether you're just interested in war stories, or have an
abiding interest in air mobility, We Were Soldiers
Once . . . . will probably go down as one of the very
best to come out of Vietnam, or any other war, for that
matter. Even after my third reading, it still seemed fresh
and full of new dimensions. This is a book with a very wide
perspective indeed.