A German instruction on "The Employment of Battle Flights," . . . described battle aircraft as "a powerful weapon which should be employed at the decisive point of the attack. . . . They are not to be distributed singly over the whole front of the attack, but should be concentrated at decisive points. Less important sectors must dispense with the support of battle flights."

The idea of concentrating airpower should not have been a revelation. It was merely a practical application of one time-honored principle of war-mass.7 Air leaders further argued that not only should airpower be concentrated for decisive results, but control should be vested in an air commander who understands the capabilities and limitations of airpower. Although Army officers disagreed with this concept, airmen saw it as nothing more than following another principle of war-unity of command.

After learning from the success the Germans were having with concentrated "battle flights," the American Air Service commander, Gen William ("Billy") Mitchell, convinced Gen John J. Pershing, commander of the Allied Expeditionary Force, to "concentrate (air) units from various ground commands into a powerful unified force...controlled by him (Mitchell)." Although "obtaining such strength had not been easy, for he had to meet the resistance of ground commanders who wanted the air units elsewhere...his work at Saint-Mihiel and the Argonne were landmarks in the development of airpower and the doctrine of employment."

Following World War I, General Mitchell was already predicting the decisiveness of airpower, stating he was "sure that if the war lasted, air power would decide it."11 General Mitchell "believed that for any given operation, available air units should be placed under the control of an Air Service commander. This air officer, having received the over-all plan of an operation from the superior command, would proceed to draw an appropriate air plan." At the same time, however, the Army concluded that "aviation must continue to be one of the auxiliaries of the principal arm, the infantry." In the middle of these two opposing views, two important lessons were recognized by all:

There were critical times, such as when one's front was ruptured, that required committing all available aircraft to land battle. The great battles of 1918 also demonstrated that centralized control of aviation could be as valuable in defensive warfare as in offensive operations.

Nevertheless, "experiments in centralized command encountered opposition in the ground forces, particularly among the corps and army commanders, who wanted to retain direction over `their' aviation."

Thesis

The central issue became what airpower is best used for and who controls it. This debate has raged throughout every conflict since World War I, including Operation Desert Storm. This paper examines where to draw the line between air and land battle and who should control operations on either side of that line. The focus is on designation of the fire support coordination line (FSCL), which traditionally delineates air and land operations, and similarly, the Air Force missions of interdiction and close air support.

The Air Force defines its roles as aerospace control, force application, force enhancement, and force support. This paper does not examine the Air Force roles of aerospace control (General McPeak's high battle), force enhancement, or force support (General McPeak's rear battle). Nor does it cover the force-application mission of strategic attack, which along with interdiction, comprises the deep battle. The main emphasis is on the seam between the remaining two force-application missions of interdiction and close air support.

The thesis is that, with modification, the FSCL can provide an appropriate mechanism to divide responsibilities between air and land commanders. The doctrinal definition for the FSCL needs to change to accommodate more air commander involvement for its placement. Basically, Air Force responsibilities for interdiction and close air support require no change. What is needed is more trust and understanding between joint service components.

Air and Land Delineation

The first question to answer is, Do we need a line at all to segregate service responsibilities for different geographic areas in a theater of operations? Why not just give all the forces to the joint force commander (JFC) to fight the war as he sees fit? In a sense, that is exactly what happens. The JFC has ultimate responsibility and command authority for military operations in his area of responsibility.

However, even a JFC's area of responsibility is bounded by distinct lines separating adjacent areas of responsibility. Geographic delineation provides unity of command for areas containing broad, continuing missions.19 The unified commanders and their staffs are theater experts, attuned to the threats and employment of combat forces within their respective areas. Recognizing the uniqueness of each geographic theater, individual unified commands are best prepared to conduct warfare within their own areas of responsibility, but not in adjacent areas.

Similarly, air and surface components are experts in the employment of combat forces in their particular medium. Air, land, and sea combat are all starkly different, and the members of these components spend the majority of their careers honing the skills of their respective professions. Just as unpalatable as it would be for a ground commander to acquiesce authority for fire and maneuver of his forces to an airman, it is equally unacceptable to airmen for a ground commander to presume control of airpower.

However, Army training and doctrine today still consider the chief task of airpower is to support sustained land operations, which it considers the decisive combat element. One of the tenets of Army operations is depth, defined as :

"the extension of operations in time, space, resources, and purpose. . . . What is most important...is the fact that in any operation the Army must have the ability to gain information and influence operations throughout the depth of the battlefield. This ability highlights the joint nature of deep operations, which means participation by the other services."

Clearly, Army doctrine does not intend to draw an arbitrary line to delineate close and deep battle and abdicate responsibility for deep battle to the air component commander. The problem is, even though Army doctrine espouses control of the battlefield at depth, traditionally ground commanders are far more concerned with the battle immediately in front of them than they are on threats and forces deeper behind enemy lines; this is a dangerous fixation, for in at least two well- known cases-the fall of France in 1940, and Kasserine in 1943-it contributed to notable defeats.

It was prescribed at the time that tactical air was to be used for the immediate and direct support of ground forces, that the mission of the air arm was the mission of the ground forces, and that ordinary tactical air units would be under ground commanders. Under such a philosophy of air operations, the air campaign during late 1942 and early 1943 in North Africa proved to be a model of inefficiency.

Consequently, in the aftermath of the battle at Kasserine Pass, American airpower was placed under centralized control of airmen. Ensuing doctrine stated:

"Land power and air power are co-equal and interdependent forces; neither is an auxiliary of the other...control of available air power must be centralized and command must be exercised through the air force commander if this inherent flexibility and ability to deliver a decisive blow are to be fully exploited."

Conversely, current Marine Corps doctrine subjugates its airpower to a supporting role. In addition to discussing close air support to support the ground forces, the Marines refer to the Air Force mission of interdiction as deep air support. The Marine Corps concept of operations is for independent Marine air ground task force (MAGTF) employment using its organic combined arms, which includes its supporting air component.

Considering Army Air Corps history and Marine Corps doctrine, one can imagine that airpower would be employed quite differently if exclusive control was given to ground components. In North Africa during World War II, "Air operations reflected an addiction of Army commanders for protective umbrellas and a singular lack of understanding of both the capabilities and limitations of airpower."

Even in Desert Storm, the confrontation between the Army field commanders and the Air Force was not so much about the performance of airpower as the Army's ability to control it. As the Air Force saw it, the Gulf War was a model for future conflicts. But neither the Army nor the Marines wanted to go to war that way again.

The ground components' concept for employment of airpower is understandable, given one's primary concern is for the battle raging around him. It is far easier to appreciate the effects of airpower when one sees enemy forces he is engaged with destroyed by air attack rather than be told that the bridge providing resupply to those same forces has just been destroyed by air attack. In a letter to Gen George C. Marshall, Brig Gen Paul M. Robinett reflected the prevalent opinion held by most ground commanders in Tunisia during World War II:

What was needed were not reports or photographs of ships being sunk, ports being smashed, or cities being bombed to ashes, but seeing Allied aircraft over their front-line positions and attacking targets in the path of Allied operations. . . . To them, the only way to achieve such results was by placing aircraft under ground force command.

A similar analogy can be drawn from the airman's perspective. A fighter pilot about to engage a large enemy formation of aircraft would much rather have the Army's surface-to-air missiles be targeted against higher-threat enemy fighters than less maneuverable bombers. In this case, the most effective use of surface-to-air missiles is against enemy bombers, which present the greatest threat to the joint force as a whole. However, even though the priority for defensive counter air is to preclude the bomber from reaching its target, which may even be the fighter pilot's home airfield, a certain immediacy exists in the heat of battle when one's very survival is at risk.

The emotion of ground combat begs for every available asset to support the present battle. This is evident in Army doctrine, which seeks

"to apply overwhelming combat power to achieve victory at minimal cost....Overwhelming combat power is achieved when all combat elements are violently brought to bear quickly, giving the enemy no opportunity to respond with coordinated or effective opposition."

The Army plans to sequence all combat elements for decisive land engagement. "Many other operations lead to or support decisive operations. For example, two supporting ground battles, an interdiction operation, and a deception operation could all support a separate decisive ground battle." The Army's preoccupation with the decisiveness of ground battle, relegating other combat elements to supporting roles, tends to shorten its perspective of depth to the close battle. This short-sightedness was still prevalent in Desert Storm, where "the ground generals who controlled the war-Schwarzkopf and Powell-were not inclined to accept the notion that an invading army could be destroyed from the air."

Conversely, Air Force doctrine states, "Aerospace control normally should be the first priority of aerospace forces." After aerospace control and strategic attack, the Air Force sees the most effective force-application roles progressively diminishing from the deep battle (interdiction) to the close battle (close air support). However, Air Force doctrine still embodies the important lessons from World War I: "Although close air support is the least efficient application of aerospace forces, at times it may be the most critical by ensuring the success or survival of surface forces."

Fire Support Coordination Line

With the Army focus on the close battle and the Air Force's on the deep battle, it seems only natural to delineate responsibility for these battles. The separate services are best trained and equipped to fight these respective battles and are likewise ill-prepared to perform other than supporting roles outside their areas of expertise. The argument so far is wholly consistent with General McPeak's proposal to delineate responsibilities for close and deep battles. What General McPeak has not addressed is where to draw that line.

Traditionally, the line that separates close and deep battle is the FSCL. Joint service doctrine defines the FSCL as follows:

"A line established by the appropriate ground commander to insure coordination of fire not under his control but which may affect current tactical operations. The fire support coordination line is used to coordinate fires of air, ground or sea weapons systems using any type of ammunition against surface targets. The fire support coordination line should follow well-defined terrain features. The establishment of the fire support coordination line must be coordinated with the appropriate tactical air commander and other supporting elements. Supporting elements may attack targets forward of the fire support coordination line without prior coordination with the ground force commander provided the attack will not produce adverse surface effects on or to the rear of the line. Attacks against surface targets behind this line must be coordinated with the appropriate ground force commander. Also called FSCL."

The Air Force interprets the FSCL as a restrictive measure where air attacks inside the line need to be controlled by the appropriate ground commander and attacks beyond the line need to be controlled by the air component commander. During Operation Desert Storm, coalition aircraft operating inside the FSCL "could only attack under direction from ground or airborne controllers. As the . . . corollary to this rule, helicopters and tactical missiles beyond the FSCL would be controlled by the JFACC (Joint force air component commander)."

The fact that fires inside the FSCL may affect current tactical operations suggests the FSCL will be placed in proximity to friendly surface forces. Also, the word support in fire support coordination line implies that those fires are supporting an ongoing close battle. Therefore, air-to-surface attacks inside the FSCL constitute the Air Force mission of close air support and are restricted by applicable measures. There is no argument concerning the need to restrict weapons employment inside the FSCL.

The Army, on the other hand, views the FSCL as a permissive measure. While the Army establishes a FSCL to coordinate fires of air, land, or sea weapons systems inside the line, fires beyond the FSCL do not affect current tactical operations and are therefore considered unrestricted.38 The reason to restrict other components' fires inside the FSCL is to avoid fratricide by fires not under Army control.39 The Army intends to engage targets beyond the FSCL and has some assets to do so, but coordination with air or sea components is not deemed necessary since there is little perceived risk of fratricide. In other words, targets beyond the FSCL are considered to be in a free-fire zone.

The Air Force disagrees. Simultaneous to the close battle, the Air Force is attacking targets in the deep battle before they come in contact with friendly surface forces. Therefore, fratricide is a valid reason to restrict fires beyond the FSCL, just as it is inside the FSCL. Friendly aircraft are attacking targets in airspace that unrestricted surface-to-surface ordnance flies through. Army doctrine recognizes "the highest probabilities of conflict between aircraft and indirectly delivered supporting fires occur . . . in the immediate vicinity of firing unit locations and target impact areas. With the exception of these two areas, the probability of aircraft and indirect fire conflict is relatively low."40 Not only fixed-wing aircraft operate beyond the FSCL, but helicopters as well. The big sky theory, suggesting an acceptable low probability of an artillery shell hitting a friendly aircraft, does not "fly" with airmen.

Joint doctrine provides contradictory guidance on whether the FSCL is restrictive or permissive. While the joint definition for the FSCL does not stipulate either restrictive or permissive, Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, clouds the issue by saying that the

"Fire Support Coordination Lines (FSCLs) are permissive fire support coordinating measures. . . . An associated benefit of employing an FSCL is the reduction in potential for fratricide. . . . Commanders employ restrictive measures to enhance the protection of friendly forces operating beyond the FSCL."

Apparently, restrictive measures to prevent fratricide beyond the FSCL are an appropriate consideration for combat commanders. Another argument to restrict fires both inside and outside the FSCL is to avoid duplication of effort. Although striking a target with multiple service assets, hopefully for the airman not simultaneously, may increase the probability of success, it is not the most efficient use of resources. Uncoordinated multiservice attacks on the same target do not constitute the intent of joint warfare.

"Joint and combined operations demand careful synchronization of operations to effect . . . mutual support, efficient use of all available resources, and the ultimate application of force to achieve the strategic purpose." Even if the Army maintains that the low probability of fratricide does not warrant restricting its ability to engage targets beyond the FSCL, efficient use of limited joint resources to avoid duplication of effort seems prudent.

The point is that some management tool is needed to separate areas where functional components have the preponderance of assets to employ, while they are not the primary force provider in adjacent areas. The FSCL is an appropriate restrictive measure to delineate close and deep battle responsibilities. What is key is a common understanding of the term. Fires inside the FSCL are clearly the purview of the ground component commander. Operations beyond the FSCL do not directly affect the current tactical operations of the appropriate ground commander and should therefore be considered part of the deep battle.

I found your reprint of Lt. Colonel New's (USAF) article interesting but at the same time a little disconcerting. Colonel New's analysis of the role of airpower is unfortunately an often heard viewpoint - that airpower ("alone" being spoken under the breath) is the decisive factor of the modern battle.

The first piece of the article does a good job of correctly showing why air forces need to be controlled by a knowledgeable air commander. Unfortunately, the latter half of the article degenerates into the provincial attitudes a few Air Force proponents seems to be stuck on. Colonel New brings up the supposedly frequent "confrontations" that occured during the operational and strategic coordination for Desert Storm in 1991.

He claims that Army commanders were obsessed with "the ground ahead":

This short-sightedness was still prevalent in Desert Storm, where "the ground generals who controlled the war-Schwarzkopf and Powell-were not inclined to accept the notion that an invading army could be destroyed from the air."

These observations were very prevalent in media commentary shortly following Desert Storm. This is unfortunate becuse Schwarzkopf worked very well with the Commander of Air Forces in the region - in fact, his directives boiled down to a very simple list of what he wanted accomplished before the ground war began. Schwarzkopf, an Army commander, was very supportive in letting the Air Force (and Navy) do what it wanted in the "deep battle." This was in following with the Army doctrine of the "AirLand Battle" concept - simultaneous engagements of maximum force in the deep, medium, and close battles.

The "confrontations" that Colonel New refers to were much less frequent than the media led to believe. When they did occur, they occured mostly during the ground war itself where there were troops on the ground in jeopardy and in need of CAS. Colonel New's final comment about ground generals not believing that invading armies can be destroyed from the air is actually true.

This is a fact that was accepted by the Commander of Air Forces in Desert Storm. Invading armies can not be destroyed from the air, nor can a country's will be broken with repeated bombings (both North Vietnam and current day Iraq are excellent examples of this). Invading armies can be strangled from the air, on occasion. Starved, harrassed, and frightened from the air so that when our tanks come charging over the dunes, the will is weakened and the combination of air and land forces (the epitomy of the AirLand Battle) allow our forces to win the field.

This sort of synergy is imperative in the "real" modern battlefield. Colonel New seems to have missed this point. General Horner, commander of the 9th US Air Force during Desert Storm luckily did not. He said that "this particular theatre [Iraq], this particular enemy, this particular situation, really emphasises the attributes that air brings to the battle. In another situation, say for example today in Yugoslavia, air does not have nearly the importance because of terrain, weather, the nature of the enemy, things of that nature."

And let us never forget the words of the Iraqi tank commander who told the officer he surrendered to that after weeks of bombing he had lost three tanks. After one hour of combat against our ground forces, he lost them all. I highly recommend the Army Field Manual 100-5 "Operations" if you are interested in learning more about the details of the AirLand Battle doctrine.