James Francis Edwards was born in Battleford, Saskatchewan in 1921. His youth in the depression-era prairies was fairly typical of the time. He grew up with sports, primarily softball in summer and hockey in winter, hunting, trapping and work. When he was nine he started his first job delivering milk in the early mornings with his brother Bernie.

In the winter he and his brother Bernie jogged alongside the milkwagon to keep warm. The dairyman paid them in milk, for money was in short supply. At home he did chores, primarily a lot of wood chopping to keep the stove going and the house warm. It took a lot of wood to heat a house in the Saskatchewan winter when temperatures could easily hit -40 C for weeks at a time. On the weekends he checked a trapline he ran along the Battle River for muskrat, beaver, fox and especially ermine.

He starting plinking at birds and gophers with a .22 in the fields when he was nine. Before that he made do with slingshots and home-made bows and arrows. By the time he was twelve he and Bernie were using the family 12-gauge pump shotgun for hunting Hungarian partridge, prairie chickens, ducks and geese. By the time he was eighteen he was known around Battleford as a good shot. As with many other aerial aces, this form of hunting was probably crucial to understanding how to lead a bird, or an aircraft, so that he could hit a rapidly moving target.

In the summers, he and his brother worked on a dairy farm. The cows were milked twice daily, once at 4:30 AM and again in the evening. By 7 AM they were in for breakfast then a full day of mowing or raking hay. By 4:30 PM they were milking again, then it was in for supper. Following this was a milk-run for local customers. The hard work ensured that they slept well at night.

By High School Jim was an excellent hockey player. His love for the game nearly got him a try-out for the Chicago Black Hawks, but the war interfered with those dreams. In 1939, he and his friends spent hours discussing the early war activities and all agreed that the RCAF was where they wanted to be, despite never having been close to an airplane. All of them became fighter pilots. Of his two friends one completed two tours on Spitfires and ended the war as a Squadron Commander, the other was lost in the sea off Sicily.

In 1940, he graduated from grade 12 and hitch-hiked the 100 miles to Saskatoon to the RCAF recruiting station. He passed the physical easily and broke the time record for holding his breath. After the tests and forms he was sent home to wait for his call-up notice. That summer he worked on a friend's farm in northern Alberta, returning to the Battleford area in time to drive a team of horses during harvest.

Finally, he got his call-up notice, a rail warrant, and meal tickets and was instructed to proceed to Manning Depot, Brandon, Manitoba. By October he was in the RCAF as a Leading Aircraftsman. The first weeks were spent at Manning Depot with orientation, indoctrination, etc.... Then he was off for six weeks of guard duty at the MacDonald Bombing and Gunnery School.

Eventually he starting training to be a pilot at Initial Flight Training School in Regina, Saskatchewan. He graduated to No. 16 Elementary Flying Training School in Edmonton, Alberta where he started flying on the venerable de Havilland Tiger Moth. His first flight must have been a chilly one on January 30, 1941. His instructor drilled into him that a stall meant loss of control and that was bad. They showed him how to maintain speed and control the aircraft in tight turns, and in landing, two of the most critical times when stalls will occur. He logged 83 hours on Tiger Moths and graduated to Service Flying Training School (SFTS).

In April, 1941 they got to No. 11 SFTS at Yorkton, Sask. to start training on North American Harvards. SFTS introduced the men to the more complex topics of flying, particularly navigation, gunnery, and formation flight. By June 20 he had another 102 hours in the air, with 17 at night. Because everything at Yorkton was new, including the instructors and the curriculum, they got more flying time than would occur later in the war. He graduated as a Sergeant Pilot in the RCAF and was posted to overseas duty, departing for Scotland from Halifax, Nova Scotia.

The troop train took five days and nights to reach Halifax, with only a few unscheduled stops along the way. The billet in Halifax was a stone warehouse along the docks. Halifax was a totally new experience: the ocean, the buildings, the rank smell of fish on the wharves. By the middle of July their convoy had formed up and they were embarked on the troop ship Ausonia.

Several squadrons of Canadian pilots and Australian groundcrew who had completed their training in Canada were embarked together. It was a fast, armed merchant cruiser that was excellent for ferrying troops. They stuck with the convoy for three days then split off for a fast run to Iceland. There they spent ten days waiting for another ship to get them to Scotland. They tried to teach the Aussies softball but it usually resulted in confusion and hot tempers as the Aussies thought they were just making up the rules as they went.

Eventually an old steamer, the Leopoldville from the Belgian Congo, took them to Greenoch, Scotland. There they boarded a train for Leamington, England and a Pilots Pool Depot. At Leamington they waited for their assignments to an Operational Training Unit (OTU) in either Fighter, Bomber or Coastal Command. He was posted to No. 55 OTU at Usworth, Durham. He would fly Hawker Hurricanes for Fighter Command.

OTUs were the last training stop for pilots prior to operational flying. With Fighter Command they were introduced to fighter aircraft, albeit obsolete and clapped-out Hurricane Is, but they were a far cry from Harvards. These aircraft had survived the Battle of Britain, so they were well worn by time they were shipped to an OTU.

On October 1st, 1941 he was on his fifth flight of the day in a Hurricane when he made his first serious error. The engines of the Hurricanes had been cutting out on take-off. The mechanics and instructors figured out that if they used the 35-gallon reserve tank on take-off, rather than the main tank, the aircraft could get airborne. Once up the instructor would call out "switch over to main tank". Jim didn't hear the order as he was concentrating on flying formation with his leader in a dark cloud bank.

Suddenly his engine cut out and he started down. Keeping his head he radioed his predicament to base and came down slowly through the cloud. He had only 500 feet of air left before he hit the ground so he side-slipped the Hurricane towards a farmer's small field. He cleared the stone fence and slid to a halt within 75 yards. This was good as the field was only about 100 yards across.

The Hurricane suffered less damage than did Jim's pride. The CO made sure he understood what had caused the failure and that it was all good experience and hoped that he learned from it. He was back in the air the next day. Jim completed the course on October 20 with 40 hours on the Hurricane I. There was no training provided on actual combat drill, and it likely wouldn't have helped much, as the RAF flight drill was also outdated. But there was also no mention of what to do when your flight was bounced by Messerschmitts, how to counter the enemy's moves in the air or how to get into a good firing position, all crucial points for a successful fighter pilot.

He was shipped out in a convoy for the middle east. To get there they took a route down the west coast of Africa (due to the likelihood of being spotted by U-boats or aircraft and sunk in the Mediterranean). Their destination was Freetown, Sierre Leone and then by aircraft to a dirty little town on the coast of Ghana called Takoradi.

At Takoradi there was an RAF Ferry Unit base where the pilots were familiarized with the Hurricane IIb fitted with long range tanks. Their mission was to ferry the Hurricanes, and themselves, to Cairo via a string of small bases across the heart of Africa and up the Nile River. If an engine failed or a pilot became lost, his death was almost a certainty in the thick jungle of central Africa or the blistering heat and sand of the Sahel. Little help was available.

His first day took him to Accra and Lagos, Nigeria. Next stop was the town of Kaduna in the uplands of northern Nigeria, then to Maiduguri near the border of Chad. There his Hurricane was declared unfit for further duty, which must have made him feel good about making it that far. He returned to Takoradi on a commercial DC-3.

His second trip across Africa was as a second pilot in a Bristol Blenheim IV, despite not being checked-out on twin engine aircraft. This trip went better with stops at Kano, Nigeria; El Geneina, El Facher and Waidi Sadena, Sudan; Wadi Halfa on the Egyptian border and Luxor, Egypt. In Cairo he again entered a pilot pool waiting for assignment. Here he met up with his comrades from the ship, it had taken them all two weeks to get to Cairo.

War in the Western Desert

The middle east air war was not as glamorous as battling with the Luftwaffe over France, but it was equally dangerous, and more brutal. No pilots trooped off to the local pub to lift a pint, and their spirits, after a day in battle in the middle east. All they had were meager rations of water, and bulley beef, and all of the sand they could eat. Scorching hot by day, nearly freezing at night, the north African desert was unforgiving, featureless and omnipresent. At least their Landing Grounds (LGs) were usually built back from the coast to avoid the hordes of flies that infested the inhabitable areas ...

Cairo was the main detachment centre for the western desert forces, and for the RAF forces in Burma and India. Jim waited two weeks for an assignment. Eventually, he was posted to 94 Squadron flying Hurricanes from an anonymous spot in the desert called Antelat. He and a bunch of replacement pilots were unceremoniously loaded into an ancient Bristol Bombay transport plane and flown to a dusty LG near Tmimi on the coast to find out where 94 Sqdn. was located. Then it was on into the desert at only 50 feet altitude to avoid enemy fighters.

They landed at Antelat in the middle of a raid, with AA guns barking at a pair of Junkers Ju-88 light bombers. They loosed their bombs over the airfield and left with no real effect. No Hurricanes raced off to intercept the bombers, since they were all mired in the mud. The pilots themselves were a sorry, demoralized lot since 94 Sqdn. had lost some men and many aircraft in the past few days. There were only four Hurricanes left, and everything appeared to be in shambles. There was little in the way of equipment, food or resources.

Their losses came at one of the periodic climaxes of the desert war. During Britain's "Crusader Offensive" of Nov. 1941, the 8th Army relieved the siege of Tobruk and forced Lt. General Erwin Rommel's troops across Cyrenaica to El Agheila. Rommel's men fought back stubbornly and gave ground up slowly. Eventually, British supplies were severely hampered by the increased bombing of Malta, attacks on the port of Alexandria and the presence of U-boats in the Mediterranean.

Conversely, this meant that the Axis improved their supply position. With increased supplies the German and Italian forces rebounded in January, 1942. The RAF's Desert Airforce (DAF) fighters were mauled, losing 13 in several days. In attempts to bomb the retreating British forces German and Italian Ju-87 Stukas and Macchi MC-200s were, in turn, badly shot up by DAF Hurricanes and Curtiss P-40 Tomahawks. The 8th Army retreated to a chain of primitive, dug-out fortifications for tanks, artillery and infantry known as the Gazala Line and waited.

The Luftwaffe commander in the Mediterranean, Feldmarshal Albert Kesselring thought that the ground advance should be halted so that Malta could be subdued and so ensure the supply routes across the Mediterranean. Then North Africa could be taken. Malta's position south of Sicily made it an excellent location for Allied forces to launch planes against German and Italian convoys heading to Tripoli. Without Malta the entire English presence in the Mediterranean was seriously threatened. It was a sound strategy, except that it didn't include Erwin Rommel.

Without orders and with few supplies Rommel had his men probed the British positions in front of him and found that they were lightly held and gave way immediately. In a gamble he swung some armour across the desert to Mechili while the bulk of his forces took Benghazi completely by surprise. The British forces fell back in confusion.

February and March saw Rommel's forces advance to Tmimi and take up positions west of Gazala. But his troops were too weak to start an assault on the British so he began building supplies for another advance. All of this activity merely distracted Hitler's attention away from Malta, the key to the Mediterranean. Eventually Rommel's successes and his ability to convince Hitler that his was the right course, diverted enough men and materiel away from "Operation Herkules" that Malta was never taken by the Germans. Rommel was an excellent tactician, but a poor strategician. He didn't, and wouldn't, understand Kesselring's superior plan.

The English rail line from Alexandria to Mersa Matruh had been pushed forward to Tobruk and supplies were being brought forward by road and rail. Tobruk was a key port on the Cyrenaican coast and had to be held against Rommel in order to resupply and rebuild the 8th Army. It would also enable the RAF to retake the airfields in order to intercept German and Italian convoys to Benghazi. This was the situation when Jim "Eddie" Edwards joined the Desert Air Force. The English tradition is to make a nickname from a person's last name, hence Edwards became "Eddie."

Curtis P40 Kittyhawk

The Battles for the Gazala Line and Tobruk

Eddie and the rest of the Squadron pulled up stakes and moved east to Mechili and then to a bare patch of desert called LG 110. Here they received new American-made Curtiss P40 Kittyhawk I fighter-bombers for their Hurricanes and got a new Squadron Leader, S/L Ernest "Imshi" Mason.

He had 17 victories over the Italians during the Libyan Campaign with 80 and 274 Squadrons. He also had experience over Malta, was shot down and wounded, and spent time in Palestine and Iraq before moving to north Africa. A month later he was posted as S/L to 94 Sqdn. By the middle of February S/L Mason and some experienced pilots flew to another LG to begin ops with the Kittyhawks while Eddie and the rest continued training. The day after, Mason led 18 aircraft of 94 and 112 Sqdns to bomb the German airbase at Martuba.

Their raid was not a total surprise and a single Messerschmitt 109 got off the ground piloted by Oberfeldwebel Otto Schultz. He succeeded in shooting down five Kittyhawks, including Mason's, killing him. 94 Sqdn. was pulled from the front lines and ordered to regroup for training. Their new S/L was Ian MacDougall, a survivor of the Battle for France and the Battle of Britain. He immediately undertook a serious training program on desert fighter tactics.

For the next three weeks he briefed the pilots on what operations were all about. In the air they practiced air firing, flight and battle formations, and finally the basics of dog-fighting with other aircraft. By the end of March they were declared operational and sent back into the front line joining their companion, 260 Sqdn.

Both the Axis and Allied air forces were tasked with interrupting the other army's supply lines and with protecting theirs. Any major disruption could have an important impact on the armored columns that meant victory or defeat in the desert. The DAF operated Curtiss P-40 Kittyhawks for interceptors and ground attack, while Hurricanes and P-40 Tomahawks were used mostly for ground attack (although they were all used for interceptors on occasion).

Facing them were the Luftwaffe flying Messerschmitt Me-109Fs and the Regia Aeronautica in Macchi MC-200s, and MC-202s as interceptors. They also used Me-110s for transport escorts. Unfortunately for Jim and the rest of the DAF, the Kittyhawk was no match for the Me-109F.

The Allies had several squadrons of Douglas A-20 "Boston" and Martin "Baltimore" light bombers that they used as their principal offensive air weapons. Most missions that the Kittyhawks flew were to provide cover for the bombers that were attacking ground forces, aircraft or installations.

The Axis used Me-109Fs, Me-110s, Ju-87 "Stukas", Italian Macchi 200s and obsolete Caproni CR-42 biplanes in the ground attack role. Under good aerial protection the Stukas were excellent dive bombers, but if there was any significant opposition they lost heavily. The Axis had no bombers as good as what the Allies could field. The best they had was the Heinkel He-111 but they had too few and they were easy targets for fighters. They also used Ju-88s, and Italian BR20s but both of these aircraft lost heavily if there were Allied fighters to oppose them.

94 Squadron's first day of full operations was a standing patrol over the Gazala-Tobruk lines. They were bounced by Me-109s and lost a pilot. Two days later they escorted South African Airforce (SAAF) bombers to Martuba, the nearest Axis air base, in the hopes of tying down their aircraft so that an Allied convoy could get past them. p> Martuba was a complex of airbases that was home to several Italian Gruppos of Macchi 202s and the fearsome German Jagdgeschwader-27 "Wustengeschwader" (Desert Wing). A Geschwader was roughly equivalent to a British Wing and was composed of three Gruppen, rough equivalents of Squadrons, in all about 90 aircraft.

The great German ace Leutnant Hans-Joachim Marseille (right above), at that time an "experten" with 52 confirmed victories, was among them, and would eventually account for many of their losses. Other major aces in JG-27 were Obfw Otto Schultz with 46 victories and Oberleutnant Gustav Rodel (on left) with 32 victories.

The raid was to be carried out by 12 Bostons of the SAAF escorted by Kittyhawks from 94 and 260 Sqdns. It was Eddie's first operational sortie. They approached the airfield flying parallel to the coast so they had a clear point of reference to avoid getting lost over the desert. In short order they were over the enemy airfield at 10,000 feet. The first three Bostons went down in flames from intense Flak. Then the Me-109s attacked from below, up through the squadrons. The bombers unloaded over the base, dropped their noses to gain speed and turned for home.

Eddie was concentrating on following his leader when a Messerschmitt popped up in front of his Kittyhawk. Instantly he pressed the firing button and his six .50 caliber machine guns blew the enemy plane apart. Quickly, he tried to locate his leader but saw instead another German fighter firing at him. He pushed the stick far forward as cannon shells passed over his cockpit. He half-rolled his fighter and headed for the deck while trying in vain to spot a friendly fighter. Eddie followed the coast until he located a known position. Now all he had to do was find his base. But where was it?

The Germans produced an incredible number of Fliegerabwehrkanone or "Flak" guns to protect their troops in the field and eventually to provide a moderately effective system of radar directed Flak and searchlight systems to protect their major industrial cities, in particular those of the Ruhr valley.

In severe contrast to the normal scenery, was the desert floor. Seen from above, it offered no evidence of habitation or life. There were shades of sand, brown and darker spots or lines were intermixed and, to the novice, it was described as the "bundoo". There was nothing of note for miles in the vastness below. Some pilots had more trouble than others finding their way around; novices could be right over an airfield and not recognise anything at first glance. Then, the sun would glitter off an aircraft perspex or something else on the ground, and the entire camp would come into focus. It would become obvious an airstrip lay in the centre. Then there was the blinding sunlight of the desert.

"Sometimes annoying, sometimes a hindrance, it was helpful when attacking or navigating. The desert was the sun. It was common practice to go down on the deck sixty to eighty miles from home base and, with the aid of a compass or directional gyro aligned with the position of the sun, set course and arrive over our field. The sun was an important factor in all navigation and operational flying in the desert."

He eventually found the base by following his excellent sense of location and timing. The raid turned out to be a fairly successful one as experience would show. Unfortunately, the bombers made the mistake of flying at 6,000 feet, the perfect altitude for light Flak, and they lost three, as well as a Kittyhawk pilot for two Me-109s destroyed and one damaged. They came off lucky. The Wing Commander nicknamed Jim "the Hawk of Martuba" for his shooting that day. It was to be prophetic.

Operations were constant, roughly every second day 94 and 260 Sqdns escorted bombers of the SAAF. They frequently lost pilots and every trip saw more damage on the Kittyhawks from fighters and Flak. The Me-109s were in constant flight over Martuba and had the upper hand by flying higher than the Kittyhawks. They would dive on the Allied bombers and fighters and zoom up to regain altitude, position themselves and dive again. Generally, they contented themselves with shooting down the escort fighters, rarely penetrating the layers of Kittyhawks to get at the bombers.

Operations became a continuous series of fast passes, and quick shots. For several days Allied fighters and bombers kept the Martuba base hopping to distract German aerial attention away from an Allied convoy heading from Alexandria to Malta. It would be one of the last successful convoys to Malta for some time. The Allies also kept standing patrols over the strategically important area outside of Tobruk called El Adem. It would later become a hotly contested piece of desert by the armored columns of both sides.

Edwards and his leader had another close brush with the Germans of JG-27 when they were bounced on an escort mission. His leader turned them into the attack just right so they both fired at an approaching Messerschmitt. It exploded in a ball of flame and fell to the desert. Eddie didn't claim a partial as he was sure his leader had hit it. He found that close escort on bombers was more frustrating than flying in the upper or middle layers of the protective escort fighters. He champed on the bit when their Kittyhawks in the top-cover were dog-fighting with Germans and all he could do was fly his position and watch the action.

"It might have been a little safer from the 109's than flying top cover, but it gave me the jitters. I felt helpless because I couldn't do anything. But, that's what the air force calls discipline, or formation discipline - doing what you are told to do and not what you would like to do." p>
Curtis P40 Kittyhawk

"I never thought much of being anywhere else. In fact, I was having the time of my life. Little things didn't matter; only the important things counted. Uniforms and parades were unheard of and not necessary. Only rank insignias were worn with any regularity. There was no such thing as a social function or party or special gathering that might pro rate anyone's rank or position."

When he wasn't on flight duty he practiced "shadow firing". He flew south of the base for several miles and found an unused area. At low level he flew parallel to the sun so that the plane's shadow was on his wing tip. When he turned towards the shadow it moved forward. He would then lay off some deflection and fire. If he used the correct deflection his bullets would hit the shadow on the desert floor. This also developed his ability to fly low and fast and not become mesmerized by the ground. He also had to concentrate on firing and to always keep a lookout for enemy aircraft. The WC also took them up to practice the finger four formation with two lead aircraft being followed by two wingmen. This was learned from the basic German formation called a Schwarm, and is still in use by fighter pilots.

Despite training courses their losses continued to be heavy, although not much heavier than other Kittyhawk/Tomahawk squadrons. On May 9, 94 Squadron received a shock. They were posted to the Nile Delta, the backwater of the war. They handed over their Kittyhawks and were ordered out of the western desert, except for Edwards and six others who showed some promise. They were ordered to cross the airfield and join 260 Squadron. It didn't seem to be any better than 94 Sqdn. as their operations were one shambles after another.

"260 still flew the stupid Hurricane formation with six aircraft in a flight. There were three section leaders and three weavers flying behind. Everyone looked after their own tails and no one coordinated anything when the 109's showed up. It seemed that everyone was for himself and the weavers had a hell of a time trying to keep up with their leader while weaving and watching behind. As a defensive formation, it was a confused glob of aircraft that could be turned into a confused shambles by a small number of 109's attacking from above, out of the sun. No wonder the 109's shot down so many! With their superior speed and height, the Messerschmitts had the superior initiative to engage or disengage at will."

He had the distinct impression that the Kittyhawks were there just to divert the German's attention from the bombers. When the 109s attacked it became every man for himself. In order to combat the 109s they had to turn in to the attacker, but to do so was to isolate oneself from the Squadron. No one came to your aid. But in 260 Sqdn. no one ever discussed tactics to more effectively combat the Germans. It drove him to distraction, he could see that they needed tactics and practice, but as a Flight Sergeant he was too low down the pecking order in the Squadron to be able to do anything about it.

From February to mid-May, 1942 a lull existed in the western desert as both sides renewed their strength, received more tanks and men and built up stores for a renewed offensive in June. The Desert Air Force consisted of only 320 aircraft, with only some 200 operating in the Tobruk and front-line areas. Facing them were just over 700 Axis aircraft, 500 of which were in the operational area, with a slight preponderance of Italians over Germans. Rommel was planning a knock-out blow to General Ritchie's 8th Army. Ritchie on the other hand was planning his static box formations around Tobruk as a base for further operations.

"Eddie" had joined 260 Squadron just as Rommel was kicking off his last major offensive of the desert war. 260 Squadron were posted to Gasr El Arid, south of Gambut, about 20 miles from Tobruk and 30 from the front. On the evening of May 25 a large German air raid on Gasr El Arid intending to knock out as many of the RAF planes as possible, started Rommel's "Operation Theseus". The next day saw a series of large duels in the air with the Luftwaffe generally coming out ahead. Rommel's troops moved forward the night of May 26 in long columns. The Italians attacked Ritchie's troops around the coastal road as a diversion while Rommel and much of the German armour headed south in an end-run of the English positions.

The German Panzers hit them hard from the flank at Bir Hacheim and got behind their west-facing formations. The Desert Air Force was tasked with intercepting and destroying as many armoured vehicles as possible. This left the Kittyhawks open to attacks from the Axis fighters and they paid heavily in downed aircraft. Eddie didn't see action until May 29 when Rommel had halted his troop's initial foray and regrouped them in an area to be called the "cauldron". 260 Sqdn. escorted Boston bombers on a raid to the area. He took up number two position in the flight behind the bombers.

The first group of armour they came upon didn't return the machine gun fire from the bombers so they assumed they were Allies (it was difficult to tell one column from another from the air). Another four miles on a concentrated column of vehicles started shooting at them so the South African bombers let them have it. Eddie could see the bombs exploding in and around the column with pretty good effect. The bombers put their noses down for speed, with the Kittyhawks following them closely. As usual 109s and Macchi 202s attacked from above. Eddie banked right and put some bullets into the nearest 109 with little obvious effect. The entire Squadron did little better, with two pilots killed, one was the WingCo, for only two damaged Axis aircraft.

Air raids were continuous night and day on the airfields. The ground crew and off-duty pilots had everything loaded into the Squadron trucks, ready to evacuate at a moments notice should the Africakorps break through the 8th Army stronghold of Gazala. The Luftwaffe was trying hard to snuff them out.