By David "Hunter" Proeber

  INTELLIGENCE

Just as in 1950, allied forces are widely dispersed and far out in front of their supply lines. Air support has been sporadic at best and the moment is ripe for a Chinese entrance into the second Korean War.

In the early hours of the campaign, you are faced with a dilemma. Do you try to establish air superiority or protect fleeing units hard pressed by attacking Chinese troops? In the far western part of the campaign, U.S. commanders have blundered by pressing a hurried attack toward Sinuiju.

Chinese units can easily sweep southward and cut their lines of communication. Loss of these units would be very costly. The same is true for units northward near the town of Chosan on the Yalu and a marine brigade at Chosin Reservoir. Chinese artillery brigades are about to hammer them to pieces, but that's a long way to fly A-10s without adequate air superiority.

In the late morning hours of the campaign it becomes apparent that the Chinese are attempting to force a march on Seoul, itself. A crack division from the north is headed south at Blitzkreig speed. Its centers of mass are the Chinese 110th and 3760th armored battalions and their supporting artillery and headquarters units. The morale of all other units in this campaign are linked to these brigades. Destroy them, and a lot of problems may be prevented.

Another set of problems have come about as a result of the lightning Chinese advance. Fearing loss of the South to DPRK forces early on in the war, U.S. forces located tactical nuclear artillery shells at Osan Ammunition Storage Depot. The Chinese know about it and fearing their use against the People's army have targeted the depot with a strategic bombing mission.

U.S. military leaders later learn of the Chinese intelligence coup and decide to move the artillery rounds to Japan via C-130 transport from Suewon military airfield. Two transports are waiting. One will also be reserved for South Korean President Kim Young Sam and his cabinet. They are scheduled to leave at 5:00 p.m. if Chinese forces appear likely to cross the 38th parallel.

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In the eventuality Chinese forces enter Seoul, prevent the loss of Suewon field and maintain security for the flight of Cowboy 9, the two C-130s evacuating the President and the nukes. Their loss would prove a grave crisis for the Clinton administration.

Download Chosin: China's revenge. Comments? Contact David "Hunter" Proeber.

REFERENCES

The Air Campaign - Planning for Combat. Col. John A. Warden III, USAF, The Air Force Association. 1989 (Originally published in 1988 by NDU Press and served as the model for air operations in Desert Storm).

On to the Yalu. Edwin P. Hoyt, Stein and Day, New York. 1984.

This is War. David Douglas Duncan, Little and Brown, London. 1951.

Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf. Keaney and Cohen, Naval Institute Press. Annapolis. 1993.

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