On October 18, 1942, Marine COL Harold "Joe" Bauer was informed another Japanese air raid was inbound to beleaguered Guadalcanal from the Imperial bastion at Rabaul. The target was Henderson Field, home of the "Cactus Air Force" and objective that was at the center of the entire Guadalcanal campaign for both sides. As long as the American Marines and soldiers could hold Henderson, US aircraft could protect a build-up on Guadalcanal that would mean certain victory in the months ahead. Ultimately a US victory at Guadalcanal meant a US triumph in the South Pacific.

Knowing this, the ships and air fleets of the Japanese Combined Fleet, supported the Japanese Army's own build-up on Guadalcanal whose target was the Marine perimeter around Henderson Field. If the Japanese could seize the air strip, the strategic situation would be reversed. Their planes could protect a land build-up and the US garrison would be starved into humiliating submission. Whoever held the crude little airstrip on the "Canal" would win what had developed into a massive air, sea and land campaign.

Bauer knew well the harsh and perilous conditions existing for the pilots of "Cactus Air Force." In a previous tour on Guadalcanal as commander of Marine squadron VMF 212 he had become an ace. On the day of his arrival for his second tour he shot down three Val dive bombers over Henderson - an act that led to the award of a Congressional Medal of Honor. No wonder the flinty, tough and brilliant MG Roy Geiger, who commanded air forces on Guadalcanal, made Bauer head of fighter operations. Deeply respected by his men, who often called him "Coach", Bauer gave startling instructions during the short briefing on 18 October. After a short pep talk Bauer told his pilots, "When you see Zeros, dogfight 'em."

In retrospect Bauer's instruction appears as an unremarkable urging on the part of a pugnacious combat commander. At the time, however, it was a significant reversal of policy and an excellent illustration that the Americans, after nearly a year of war, were beginning to understand the dynamics of fighter combat.

Prior to Bauer's instructions Allied fighter pilots in the Pacific had usually fared poorly against Japan's crack Zero formations. We can see now that Japanese numerical superiority and Allied command paralysis probably had more to do with early Imperial victories than the inherent qualities of Zero fighter. However, by the time the Guadalcanal campaign began in August, 1942, many American pilots believed that their Wildcats, P-40s or P-39's were seriously outclassed by the Zero. Their commanders also assumed, correctly, that the Japanese would hold numerical superiority in most theaters. Consequently when Henderson Field opened for business and Japanese and the almost daily Japanese air attacks came in from Rabaul, some 500 miles distant, American commanders decided to emulate the tactics employed by the Air Marshall Dowding during the Battle of Britain.

Joe Foss' flight of VMF 121 at Guadalcanal

At this stage of the war, fighters had little importance beyond their ability to either protect or destroy bombers. (By 1944 this had dramatically changed and fighter-bombers had become fearsome weapons in their own right.) The Marine air commanders on Guadalcanal, very much like the British before them, instructed their fighter pilots to avoid enemy fighters whenever possible and make overhead attacks on the fast but fragile Japanese "Betty" bombers that carried the load for Imperial forces during Guadalcanal.

If forced into an encounter by Zero escorts, Marine fighters were expected to head for a cloud or employ the one advantage the Wildcat held over the nimble Zero - it's ability to dive for home at very high speed. The Marines counted on the inherent advantages of the defense to counter Japanese numerical superiority. Australian coastwatchers and radar allowed Wildcats to scramble and attack with a slight altitude advantage. Also, any American pilot who managed to bail or land a badly damaged fighter was available for further service: Japanese pilots in similar circumstances were almost certainly lost.

Many Betty bombers and some Zeros died in these encounters, but the Japanese quickly devised countermeasures to disrupt the simple American techniques. Japanese bombers attacked at very high altitude - 22,000 to 24,000 feet was typical, arrayed in an intricate "vee of vee" formation. It was a poor defensive formation which left at least one of the outside "Vee" elements vulnerable to attack and one of the bombers inside the unfortunate "vee" a particularly inviting target. However, because the Betty was almost as fast as a US fighter at high altitude, Marine fighters rarely had time for more than one run.

To make matters worse, the slow climbing Wildcat barely had time to reach the 27,000 foot altitude necessary to make their single overhead pass.(1) Also, if a Zero could engage a Wildcat for the briefest of time, the American pilot probably would not make his pass at all. Even if the American decided not to "dive out", the slightest misstep by a Wildcat pilot in such thin air could lead to a spin which meant, at minimum, that regaining attack altitude was impossible. Worse, a spin left a fighter vulnerable to Zero attack or might lead to a crash.

Initially Japanese escorts, which usually lacked radios, found the bomber formations difficult to cover. However, they soon began to proceed bomber attacks with one or two fighter sweeps designed to catch Wildcats on their climb. If the Japanese could force the Americans down, the bombers could attack unimpeded. If more fortunate, the Zeros could "bounce" vulnerable Wildcats and inflict serious losses. Avoiding Zeros was keeping US fighters in the air, but they were losing their ability to stop Japanese attacks.

Bauer's move was extremely aggressive. Combat loss, mechanical fatigue, and accidents made operations a sinkhole for aircraft on both sides. Geiger informed Halsey, overall US commander, that Wildcats and Dauntless attrition rates were 50% every ten days. Not far down the road the US war machine could match these numbers, but in October the cupboard was nearly bare. Why, then, would Bauer want to "up the ante" just when it looked as though the US was nearing the end of the resources at hand and the climatic land and air battles for Guadalcanal were just about to begin? First, Bauer realized that fighter combat in WWII was not a joust between individual aircraft. He believed that if US airmen would stick with a wingman, or, better yet, operate in the famous "finger four" formation that tactics could trump the technological superiority the Zero had in a dogfight. In a one on one engagement the Zero certainly had the upper hand.

As the great Marine ace at Cactus Joe Foss remarked, "if you were alone and saw a Zero at the same altitude you were flying, you were outnumbered and it was time to get out." Bauer himself once quipped that "The Zero is faster than the Wildcat, can out-climb it, can turn inside it and do maneuvers the Wildcat will never match. Aside from that, we have a better plane.." Bauer's comments show that he knew that a Zero was very vulnerable in a fight between formations. He told his men in late October "Be an aggressor. Have complete faith in your armor and confidence in your ability to shoot down the enemy when you get him in your sights."

Bauer counted on tactics and chaos to equalize the odds. Tactically, Bauer was a great believer in the "scissors." There were many variations of the scissors with the complex "Thatch Weave" the most famous and probably most rare. All shared a basic concept. If a pilot believed that either he or his partner was about to be hit from the rear, he turned toward his wingman. The wing reacted by also turning toward his partner. This left a pursuing fighter in a quandary: he either had to break off the attack or face a head-on pass by the second defender.

Furthermore, Bauer knew that once a fighter engagement began, the rule-book went out the window. All planes had blind spots. No pilot, regardless of skill, could track all of the action. By simply "mixing it up" Bauer knew that his men would inevitably get opportunities to fire at unsuspecting Zeros at close range. Obviously, however, his pilots would be vulnerable to counterblow. (2)

In Bauer's eyes this was a worthwhile exchange. The Zero was a wonderful aircraft but proved a poor fighter. Its legendary maneuverability, rate of climb, astounding range and excellent speed resulted from its very low weight. It is often noted that the Zero lacked armor and self-sealing fuel tanks, valuable features found in the Wildcat. Just as importantly, however, was the structural weakness of the Zero's airframe. A very few American .50 caliber rounds could cause structural failure which in turn caused explosion.

Exactly the opposite was the case for the Wildcat. Like all US aircraft the F4F was extremely rugged. The light armor provided for the pilot was proof against the Zero's .30 caliber machine guns. The inherent strength of the aircraft made it far less prone to structural failure. Consequently, barring some very bad luck, a Japanese pilot had to clobber a Wildcat with his .20 mm cannon to bring it down. If a small portion of a Wildcat's bullet stream struck home, a Zero would probably die.

This math spelled doom for Japan in the Pacific theater. It is rarely appreciated how difficult it was in World War II for one fighter to hit another. Gunsights were crude, guns often jammed and if yaw, pitch or roll were even slightly different than the pilot believed, the bullet stream would miss. If the enemy was evading, the problem multiplied. Consequently, most planes were struck from very close range. Joe Foss, like so many WWII aces, urged his men to fire at point-blank range.

Men of Marine Fighting Squadron 212

Nevertheless most rounds missed under the best of circumstances. Over Pacific skies, the small percentage of American rounds that struck home meant a torched Zero. Incidental fire from a Japanese fighter meant American mechanics would have to patch some holes. As crack Japanese pilots died off, and as Americans introduced superior aircraft such as the P38, Corsair and Hellcat, the Pacific air war became a route.

Over Guadalcanal Bauer's change of tactics paid off quickly. The battle of October 18 at least four Zeros and three Bettys went down at the cost of two Wildcats (both pilots rescued.) Two days later the Marines won another engagement which claimed the life of Ota Toshio, a leader of the vaunted Tainan Air Group and the top Japanese ace (34 claimed kills) to die in the Guadalcanal campaign.

On October 25th the Japanese launched one of their largest attacks against Cactus which included 82 aircraft of all types. Fourteen, including eleven Zeros, were destroyed by the Marines at the cost of two fighters. During this period pilots like Joe Foss and Jack Conger added significantly to their kill totals. More important was the trend that developed. Prior to mid-October the Zeros usually bested the pilots at Cactus. After this time until the end of the Guadalcanal campaign in January 1943, the pilots at Cactus normally came out on top.

The Japanese lost over 600 aircraft at Guadalcanal and far worse was to come over the Solomons in 1943. However, Joe Bauer did not live to see his decision fully vindicated. On November 14, 1942, in the midst of a savage three day naval battle that destroyed any Japanese hopes for victory at Guadalcanal, Bauer insisted on accompanying Joe Foss on a strafing run against Japanese transports. As an operational commander Bauer was not expected to fly, but his fighter pilot instincts overcame protocol. Minutes later Bauer shot down his last Zero. Simultaneously struck by anti-aircraft fire coming from a Japanese destroyer, Bauer crashed. Foss saw Bauer swimming near the shoreline of Guadalcanal and rushed back to Henderson for aid. Bauer, however, was never seen again.

1.Some accounts talk of engagements at 30,000 feet. I am skeptical that such altitudes were often obtained considering the low horsepower, poor blower and crude oxygen systems possessed by the F4F. Interviews I have done with Cactus pilots support these doubts. The Zero was likewise straining to fight at 25,000 feet for the same reasons.

2. In theory the Japanese could have countered with similar tactics but failed to do so. Japanese fighter tactics were based a very loose three plane "vee", called a "shotai", that would switch to a line-ahead attack formation when the flight leader signaled with wings and hands. To a degree the very slack Japanese formations reflected the Zero's lack of a reliable radio.

More importantly, however, the prewar Japanese doctrine had stressed an unheard of level of training. The shotai's leader and his wingmen developed an instinctive knowledge of what each other would do. Early in the war this doctrine brought spectacular results. However, as combat and inevitable operational losses mounted, the shotais lost cohesion. As was so often the case in the Pacific, the Japanese were extremely slow to react to doctrinal errors and American tactical superiority accompanied eventual numerical and technological superiority.