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Military Thinkers, Military Thoughts: Volume I, Grossman, Part II, The Psychology of Maneuver
By Dr. Simon Ng

Article Type: Feature
Article Date: August 30, 2001

Vol I: Grossman, Part I: Killology

Dave Grossman's On Killing

Mind War
It might seem a little bit removed to jump from Grossman’s thesis on the psychology of killing to considering maneuver warfare. Indeed, as I’ll discuss later, while I find his thoughts on the subject interesting, and in many cases informative, occasionally one gets the feeling that Grossman is over-extending some of his ideas. Nevertheless, the connection between battle and psychology is an important one, and Grossman has made the first step towards constructing a causal model that relates human psychology to the utility of various warfare models, articulating these ideas in Hooker’s (ed) Maneuver Warfare: an Anthology [1].

Maneuver warfare, while as old as warfare itself, has reemerged as the new warfare paradigm for the 21st century [2] (not withstanding the growth of other areas, particularly joint warfare and the so-called ‘effect-based’ philosophy—all subjects for later volumes in this series). Sun Tzu was, perhaps, the first to articulate the concept of maneuver warfare in writing, with aphorisms such as [3]:

There are only two kinds of charge in battle, the unorthodox surprise attack and the orthodox direct attack…the unorthodox and the orthodox give rise to each other, like a beginningless circle…

Many military historians will quote Sun Tzu, but fewer appreciate the origins of his teachings. The principles propounded in The Art of War grew from the Taoism, a Chinese philosophy of harmony and “path of least resistance” expounded by Lao Tse during the 5th century BC [4]. Without revealing the extensive root system that underpins the maneuver warfare tree, suffice it to say that the concept essentially involves pitting strength against weakness. Perhaps this is somewhat obtuse, so let me offer something further [5]:

The highest and purest application of maneuver theory is to preempt the enemy, that is, to disarm or neutralize him before the fight. If such is not possible, the maneuver warrior seeks to dislocate the enemy forces, i.e., removing the enemy from the decisive point…If the enemy can not be preempted or dislocated, then the maneuver warfare practitioner will attempt to disrupt the enemy…

Preempt—dislocate—disrupt. These are the tenets of the maneuver warrior. Although in US doctrine, the application of these concepts seems shackled to the idea of military operations, the academic literature makes no such provisos: maneuver warfare can be equally applied to any application of power, as can be seen by the frequent use of Sun Tzu’s principles in business and politics.

So, where do Grossman’s ideas fit in? Well, put simply, one might claim everywhere and anywhere, if one considers that human psychology underpins all manifestations of conflict. As Clausewitz so elegantly emphasized, “everyone knows the moral effect of a surprise [preemption]” [6]. In a similar manner, Leonhard persuasively argues [7] that war is not a mathematical exercise, but rather a contest of wills. So perhaps the better question is: where does Grossman see his ideas as fitting in? I would contest that, to a great degree, he too sees them fitting in everywhere and anywhere.

The Wind of Hate
Firstly, he covers the area of the Wind of Hate as it applies to maneuver warfare. It is clear that Grossman, at least at this point in his thesis, is explaining the psychological underpinnings of maneuver warfare; he is articulating the psychological reasons for maneuver warfare’s efficacy as a warfare paradigm. The reader may recall that the Wind of Hate is that factor comprising overt human hostility and aggression, and that having to confront this wind is a primary cause of mental combat fatigue in soldiers. If this factor is absent, then the possibility of death, while producing the cognitive emotion of fear, does not cause psychological casualties. The manifestation (or threat) of this Wind of Hate is a critical factor in defeating an enemy’s will. In maneuver warfare, ‘threat’ (as against manifestation) holds primacy, principally because the aim of this type of warfare is to avoid attrition, and therefore to minimize the actual manifestation of Hate.

So, does the Wind of Hate inform us on the conduct of maneuver warfare?

Acknowledging the Wind of Hate, one concludes that it may serve as an ingredient for defeating the enemy will to fight. The threat of hatred may be enough to undermine the enemy’s conviction, to batter his psychology. In Grossman’s own words, “…the potential for close-up, interpersonal hatred and aggression is more effective and has greater impact on the will of the soldier than the presence of impersonal death and destruction…” [8]. Ergo, the threat of hatred underpins maneuver’s focus on attacking into the enemy’s rear area, as in the “World War II German principle of Kesselschlacht” [9]. Or is it so obvious? To my mind, the Wind of Hate argues as much for a direct confrontation, a la attrition warfare (if I may, for the moment, jump on the maneuverist bandwagon), as much as it does for just the threat of a direct confrontation. I’m not sure Grossman has explained the psychological underpinnings of simply maneuver warfare. Rather, he has explained a critical aspect of warfare itself. The Wind of Hate holds no favor for the type of warfare conducted; it doesn’t advocate maneuver over attrition.

One of Grossman’s more interesting contributions to the field of battlefield psychology is his expansion of the flee—fight duality to include posturing, and its logical behavioral antithesis, submission [10]. Here (in considering the fight-flight-posture-submit model), I think Grossman is beginning to focus on issues that underpin (and to a degree explain the effectiveness of) the concept of maneuver warfare.

Preemption - Dislocation
If you’ll recall, one of the tenets of maneuver is the act of preemption. Preemption is the process of attacking before the enemy is ready. Another equally important component of Maneuver is dislocation—defeating the enemy by nullifying his strength. A critical weakness of any force is the fact that it can’t always exist in a state of full readiness [11]. As Grossman explains, human beings need emotional preparation to engage fully in aggressive behavior. By denying them the time for preparation, by attacking “at a time and place when the soldier [thinks] he [is] safe” we “take advantage of the stress of uncertainty” and increase the likelihood “that he will opt for flight or submission” [12].

Surprise is, of course, classical preemption. The enemy expects neither the time nor the direction of attack—the abrupt appearance of lethal threat is enough to overcome superior numbers or firepower. The surprising side has preempted, but it has also dislocated, by stripping the enemy of its strengths. This important process is heavily supported upon a foundation of human psychology.

But to my mind, Grossman leaves his most compelling contribution to the last. On Killing spent a great deal of time discussing the Milgrim factors that enable killing: distance to victim, authority to kill and group absolution. To reiterate, the distance to the victim was both an emotional and physical one; the authority to kill was strengthened by proximity; group absolution provided a distributed responsibility and a validity mechanism of support. To this point, Grossman’s thesis has cited psychology as a determinant of the effectiveness of maneuver warfare (to an extent), but it hasn’t really provided any information that might compel courses of action in maneuver. We all know, for example, that surprise tends to provide a distinct advantage, implicitly recognizing that part of this advantage derives from the psychological trauma of being “jumped from behind”. But with the Milgrim factors, we suddenly have information that actually informs our decisions in new ways.

Authority
Let me elaborate. Consider “authority”: authority can be by the presence of an authority figure, or it can be by virtue of the knowledge of an authority figure’s intent. Remember, disruption is the process of defeating the enemy by attacking his critical vulnerability. One might argue that “authority” is a critical vulnerability. How do we attack authority? Separate a force from its parent HQ by distance or by destroying its capacity to communicate. Attack command posts to the rear rather than the strong points to the front. The same act removes the enemy from the mass of his force, removing the powerful benefit of group absolution and validation. We are informed by the Milgrim factor of “authority” into attacking this critical vulnerability through a variety of actions.

At the same time, we can maximize the conviction of friendly forces by giving them ownership of the mission. Grossman argues that by using a mission orders [13] approach to command and control, where the higher commander’s intent is all-important, but responsibility for interpreting and implementing it lies with local commanders. This guarantees that at all levels, the authority figure is amongst those doing the killing, providing immediate legitimacy and where necessary, forceful demand. Distance to killing is also of particular interest. Most casualties have traditionally occurred during routs—that is, when the enemy is in retreat. Part of the reason for this is that killing is easier when one isn’t faced by the whites of the enemy’s eyes. Likewise, maneuver achieves this distancing by undermining the enemy’s will to resist (as in the case of surprise) and encouraging flight.

Quest for Order and Glory
Grossman closes his thesis by arguing compellingly for a re-evaluation of the types of personalities allowed to rise to command. Addressing specifically the behaviors of “quest for order” and “quest for glory”, Grossman argues that if modern commanders are to excel at maneuver warfare—which is neither glorious nor orderly—then they must not lust after such rewards. The observation is valid, but not particularly profound. We all know that micromanagers make great peacetime generals and lousy wartime ones.

Perhaps it would be appropriate to end this part of "Military Thinkers, Military Thoughts" with another quote from Sun Tzu [14]. It says something about leadership, maneuver and effortlessness, just like Grossman.

…the victories of good warriors are not noted for cleverness or bravery…their victories are not flukes…they position themselves where they will surely win, prevailing over those who have already lost.

Indeed.

Join a discussion about this article.

Author’s Note: Well, it’s been a long pause between the two parts of this first volume of "Military Thinkers, Military Thoughts." For that, I apologize. Work has commanded a great deal of my time recently. I will try to get the next volume to the “printers” quicker. And just to whet your appetites, the title is “Volume II, The First and Greatest: Sun Tzu on the Art of War”, where our discussions will roam across philosophy, history and human conflict.

End Notes

1. Hooker, R. D. Jr (Ed), Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology, Presidio Press, Novato CA, 1993, pp. 142-190.
   
2. For a useful introduction to the concept of maneuver warfare, I recommend Robert J. Leonhard’s The Art of Maneuver, by Presidio Press. In my opinion, Leonhard best captures the essence of the maneuver concept while managing to avoid some of the paradigm pitfalls into which others frequently blunder.
   
3. The Art of War, (trans.) Thomas Cleary, Shambhala Dragon Editions, Boston, 1988.
   
4. The reader is directed to R. L. Wing’s translation, The Tao of Power, Aquarian Press, London, 1986 or (my preference, but considerably harder to acquire) to Lin Yutang’s translation, The Wisdom of Lao Tse, Random House, NY, 1948.
   
5. Leonhard, R. J., The Art of Maneuver, Presidio Press, Novato, CA, 1991, pp. 19-20.
   
6. Von Clausewitz, C., On War, p. 185 of the Penguin Classics 1982 reissue.
   
7. In Leonhard, R. J., The Art of Maneuver.
   
8. p. 153 of "Defeating the Enemy’s Will", in Hooker, R. D. Jr (Ed), Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology.
   
9. Ibid., p 152.
   
10. The Soldier’s Options, as they are called, is, to my mind, an area that has been intrinsically understood by many ‘amateur’ historians and military theorists, but not so well by some professionals in the field. Even those who concede the existence of posturing and submitting (alongside ‘flight’) often dismiss it as a ‘soft’ aspect of warfare that doesn’t warrant modeling (with a range of specious arguments that include: it can’t be measured and therefore its inclusion would undermine the fidelity of the model). I say doesn’t warrant instead of can’t, because if pressed those same people would admit that it can in fact be modeled. Indeed, it frequently is, with varying degrees of realism and success.
    
11. For an excellent treatment of this very topic, I recommend Leonhard’s Fighting by Minutes.
    
12. p. 162 of "Defeating the Enemy’s Will", in Hooker, R. D. Jr (Ed), Maneuver Warfare: An Anthology.
    
13. Mission orders may also be referred to as auftragstaktik. This form of command and control emerged from the Reich during WWII, in response to the German Army’s recognition that the pace and dynamics of modern battle prohibited the issuing of detailed orders at the operational and tactical level. Instead, it used the principle of providing “commander’s intent” rather than a prescription of actions, allowing for local commanders to respond to the environment appropriately and not according to a set of rules outlined at a headquarters removed from the time and place of combat. I have chosen the term “mission orders” for two reasons: i) it is in English, and therefore interpretable without this digression; ii) the use of the term auftragstaktik, to my mind at least, is an attempt to legitimize the concept by obfuscation.
    
14. The Art of War, trans. by Thomas Cleary, Shambhala Dragon Editions, Boston, 1988.