It's a fact of life that all the rules and regulations that pilots have to deal with are for the most part the result of something going wrong. There are far more "Don't do this" rules than there are "Please do that" rules!!

Here's the setting of the story. It's late afternoon on a December day in England. Two pilots, very experienced in the A-10 and good friends to boot, are briefing to fly their second air to air training sortie of the day. The mission is another ACM (Air Combat Maneuvers) sortie against a single USAF Aggressor F-5 (Aggressor - elite AF squadron of F-5s that fly as bandits against AF operational squadrons for advanced air to air training).

Rather than being planned as a full blown, anything goes, turn and burn, the mission is briefed as a defensive 2v1 with the F-5 playing the role of a Mig-21 and attacking from a visual six o'clock perch (perch - the starting position for the attacker in an engagement, visual - this means all participants will have each other in sight before the engagement begins, six o'clock - the F-5 will start at the A-10s six o'clock and about one mile range The A-10s will be in line formation( side by side), 6000 feet apart).

The mission objectives are limited. In the AF, ACM means "initial offensive and defensive moves against one or more bandits, usually flown from a visual set up. "Initial moves" means that today, the A-10s will maneuver to defeat the initial F-5 attack and then will terminate the engagement before the engagement develops into a furball. The engagement is terminated with a radio call, "Knock It Off"(KIO). The KIO point in this mission will be when the supporting A-10 achieves a re-entry position for an attack on the F-5.

The rules that apply to the conduct of the mission are known as the ROE (Rules Of Engagement). ROE can be tailored to meet the mission objectives. The flight lead does that for this sortie. He specifically briefs that cross turns will NOT be flown as a defensive technique (cross turn - a break turn in response to an attack from the flight's six o'clock. In a cross turn, the two aircraft turn INTO each other. In a standard break, the two aircraft would turn in the SAME direction). The lead briefs this restriction to keep the mission objectives limited...normally, a cross turn would be an integral part of A-10 defensive options.

The flight proceeds as planned up to the third engagement. The three aircraft reposition according to the pre-briefed plan. The F-5 maneuvers back to the perch behind the A-10 on the right. This engagement has been briefed as a "hit and switch". The plan is for the F-5 to attack the A-10 on the right, wait for the break, and then switch his attack to the A-10 on the left.

The learning objectives in this ACM engagement are two-fold. First, the two A-10 pilots must observe the rules of the "Engaged Fighter/Supporting Fighter Contract". This will involve proper radio discipline and adherence to flight path deconfliction responsibilities. Secondly, the two A-10 pilots must aggressively maneuver to neutralize the F-5 while attempting to maneuver to threaten the F-5. So the DLOs (Desired Learning Objectives)are proper radio calls and good BFM (Basic Fighter Maneuvers).

The desired result for this ACM maneuver flow is for the defending A-10 to execute a break turn while the supporting A-10 will turn hard to bring his nose to the F-5. The F-5 pilot, once he sees the break turn will turn back towards the left A-10 and try to get nose on. The left A-10 pilot will see this and will make a radio crucial to the EF/SF Contract. He will use the word "switched" in describing the follow on position of the F-5. Until that call is made, the ROE stipulates that the right hand A-10 is the "engaged" fighter and as a result only responsible for keeping the F-5 in sight. The A-10 flight call sign is Cobra 12 and the F-5 is Sniper 51.

The set up begins with the A-10 lead making the call, "Sniper 51, Cobra 12 will be ready as soon as we roll out back to the West". The A-10 lead is positioning the engagement in the assigned working area (a square of airspace about 70 miles off the east coast of England over the North Sea). The F-5 answers, "Roger. OK, I'm left, eight o'clock, to the left hand guy". Cobra lead, on the right, answers, "One's Tally". The second A-10 says, "Two, tally". The F-5 is repositioning from the previous engagement and is approaching the flight from the left hand side of the left A-10.

This is important for you to visualize, because this set up eventually becomes a major factor in how events worked out. Then Cobra lead says to the F-5, "Cleared in". The F-5 answers, "Roger. It will be the right hand man now". The A-10 lead answers, "OK". The stage is now set for what turns out to be a fatal misjudgment for the A-10 lead. At this point, everyone is "fat, dumb, and happy". The flight is going just as briefed - completely. This will not last for long.

The F-5 advances his throttles, lowers his nose, and brings the right hand A-10 into his HUD. He gets a good tone (acquisition sound from the AIM-9 training missile that he is carrying), and calls, "Atoll". The term, "Atoll" has been pre-briefed to mean the launch of an air to air missile.

The pilot in the left hand A-10 has been waiting for this call. He has watched the F-5 close in from the perch. The "Atoll" call has been briefed as the "begin engagement" point for the A-10s. The left A-10 pilot slams his throttles to full power, rolls hard into the F-5 and calls, "Two, break right". Normally, Two's transmission would have been a call something like "Break right, missile. Bandit at your six o'clock, one mile, level".

This call is very important. It consists of Directive and Descriptive elements. Directive commands always precede Descriptive commentary. The wingman should have told the defender to execute a break turn to the right (directive) and that the threat is a missile from six o'clock and one mile (descriptive). But he didn't. A certain complacency has crept into the mission...things are going well, too well...the radio calls are loosening up as the comfort level continues to rise as the number of successful engagements increases.

It's at this point in the maneuver that some serious errors are made by everyone. The plan was for the right hand A-10 to break away from his wingman. Instead the lead now says," Can't...right. I'm coming left. I've got a bandit at my left seven o'clock". The wingman responds, "Roger", and immediately follows that up with, "The bandit's off nose high", and immediately adds, "Bandit's on me, extend". Lead answers, "Letting up...". This probably meant that he was unloading his g's and extending to get his speed back. It also indicates that the lead has understood that the F-5 has changed his attack as briefed.

While all of this has been unfolding, the F-5 pilot has repositioned on to the left A-10. He hears the call from the lead about "coming left" (into the wingman), and thinks it odd since the flight had briefed that no cross turns would be flown. But he does not say anything.

The wingman is completely focused on the F-5. In his mind, he has fulfilled his part of the EF/SF contract. He made the break call and followed that up with the call that the F-5 had turned away from Lead to attack him. However, the wingman did not specifically use the term "switched", nor did he actually announce that he was "engaged".

He has accurately described the maneuver flow and has directed the Lead to "extend" (and in fact the Lead responded correctly to that call), but his failure to include the word "engaged" may have been critical in the exchange of roles in the changing of the EF/SF Contract. In addition, for some inexplicable reason, even thought the wingman heard and acknowledged the lead saying that he was "coming left", the seriousness of that fact never registered. He'll carry the burden of that mistake for the rest of his life.

At this point, the F-5 is approaching the wingman from the front and above. The wingman is in a steep right bank, having pulled max g to get the F-5 on his nose. He is padlocked on the F-5. The F-5 is inverted watching the wingman.

The next thing heard is a shouted, "Knock It Off - Knock It Off!!" The call comes from the Lead aircraft. The wingman hears this and immediately looks forward to clear his 12 o'clock. As he does this, he feels a "thump" and sees a flash of orange and red flame. His aircraft goes violently out of control. The F-5 pilot is looking at the wingman when he hears the call. At that instant, he sees the wingman explode, and says out loud into his cassette voice recorder, "Andy blew up". He does not ever recall seeing the Lead aircraft.

Eleven seconds later (as computed from the ATC tapes) the wingman abandons all attempts at regaining control of his jet. It's just as well...there's nothing left but the cockpit section. He pulls the ejection handle and is blasted free of the aircraft. For the next five minutes or so, he will slowly parachute into the North Sea, all the while wondering what happened.

Well, folks, what happened is like a line from an old Paul Newman movie..."What we have here is a failure to communicate". The radio calls in this story are authentic. They were copied right out of the USAF Accident Report. Here are the "lessons learned" from the accident investigation:

1. The Lead violated a pre-briefed ROE (no cross turn). He did this most likely because, in the set up, the F-5 did not come from his exact six o'clock, but instead was slightly offset to lead's seven o'clock. Since the common response is to always break into the threat, Lead then broke left, instead of to the right as directed by the wingman.

2. The wingman failed to react to the lead's announcement that he was "coming left", even though he acknowledged the call.

3. The F-5 pilot also failed to respond to the ROE violation. He allowed the maneuver flow to continue and lost sight of the lead aircraft.

So, why did this happen? It was the accident board's conclusion that flight discipline was not intentionally broken... but it was broken. They felt that the mission briefing and the limited DLO's had induced complacency in all flight members. It was thought that the flight members had gone to great detail in specifying exactly what was going to happen in each engagement. As a result, when things changed, it was either ignored (the F-5) or not comprehended (the wingman). The conclusion was that Cobra flight has a certain outcome in mind and was unprepared for anything else.

At the time of the accident, the lead was a Squadron Weapons Officer and a graduate of the USAF Fighter Weapons School (FWS). The wingman was the Chief of the Wing Weapons and Tactics Division and was also a FWS graduate. The F-5 pilot had been an Aggressor for two years and was highly experienced, having flown F-4s before. This is about as much talent and experience as you can crowd into a three-ship.

The result was that the wingman and the F-5 pilot went on with their fighter careers, sadder but wiser. Lead never got the chance to further his career. It ended that afternoon in a fireball over the North Sea.

Click to continue

Radio Comms in Vietnam

When we last saw Wolf flight, they had just topped off and were back with Cricket looking for more tasking. Let's pick up the story there...

"Cricket, Wolf 20, any words for us?"

"Standby, Wolf. Snap 360, Buster, I'll get back to you".

"Uh oh", Wolf lead thinks to himself...something's up. Better get the flight in order. "Wolf go spread. Fence check". Cricket has just told Wolf to take up a heading north(snap 360) and to accelerate to max military power airspeed(Buster is 100% military). Lead has told his flight to get into an attack formation(spread) and to perform all cockpit checks up to placing the weapons switches "hot").

Wolf 20, Cricket, standby for words."

"Wolf 20, ready to copy."

"Wolf 20, Dodge 35 is a flight of Thuds RTB out of Pack Six and they're hurting. Cherry 08 is leaving the anchor and turning north to pick them up. Red Crown has Blue bandit activity south of Bullseye. I want you to sweep in front of Cherry. Let's get our guys home!"

The situation is that a flight of F-105s is short of gas. Cherry 08, a KC-135, is leaving his planned orbit(anchor) and is heading into North Vietnam to meet Dodge before the Thuds run out of fuel. Pack Six is the Hanoi area of North Vietnam. Bullseye is Hanoi. Our GCI radar(Red Crown)has picked up MiGs airborne south of Hanoi. Cricket wants Wolf to sanitize the airspace between Cherry and the F-105s.

"Wolf 20 copies".

Wolf lead now radios his flight, "OK, guys, it's time to earn our pay. Two and four, search level to low. Three search level to high. GIBS, let's bring home the bacon". Wolf lead has now assigned the radar search pattern for the flight and he has encouraged the F-4 backseaters(GIB- Guy In Back) to seriously get their faces in the radar scopes!

The next call Wolf lead hears is, "Wolf 23 has a bent system". This means that #4's radar is unreliable. Since the MiGs are probably in the weeds, the lead now directs #3 to search level to low, leaving the lead radar as the only radar looking up.

Lead then calls for a fuel check. He sees that each flight member has burned all the fuel out of the external tanks. Because of the critical nature of this tasking, the lead now directs the flight to jettison their external stores.."Wolf, clean off your tanks and pickle your bombs off safe". Wolf lead wants the bombs to be jettisoned so they will not explode...the flight is flying over an undercast and the lead thinks he may still be over friendly territory.

"Cricket, Wolf 20, what freq is Dodge on?" Cricket replies that he wants everyone on the same freq. Wolf flight then checks in on the new freq where Cherry 08 is already waiting. Cricket tells Wolf that Cherry 08 is at his eleven o'clock at a range of sixty miles. "Contact there, Wolf 20". The GIB in lead's a/c has locked on the tanker and reads the relative closure as less than 200 knots...this indicates that the fighters are overtaking Cherry from behind and helps confirm the radar contact. Cherry 08 acknowledges the lock on on his RHAW gear.

"Cricket, Wolf 20, bogey dope." Wolf lead is asking for an update on the bandits.

"Red Crown has two Blue bandits Bullseye 220 for 80, heading south and fast. They look like they are after Dodge".

Wolf lead now looks at his map, notes the position of the MiGs and approximates an intercept heading from his present position. Wolf flight is now at 15000 feet and doing about 550 KIAS.

"Wolf, green 'em up". Wolf is telling his flight to make sure that their weapons switches are set up for a/a missiles. At this point the arming switch is still off. By now, Wolf has passed Cherry 08 and is pressing deeper into North Vietnam.

"Wolf 21 has a contact ten right for 60, slightly low, 900 knots". Wolf two has a radar contact ten degrees right of the flight at 60nm. The relative closure is 900 knots...this means a head on set up.

"Cherry, Dodge, heading south, where are you, son?". The flight of F-105s is now in radio range and clearly needing help...the tone of the voice makes everyone's hair stand up.

Cricket tells Wolf that the radar contact is probably Dodge...the positions match up. "Dodge, Cricket, snap 200, climb to base plus 10. You have Wolf at your 1:30 clearing your six". Cricket now tells Dodge to fly a heading of 200 degrees and climb to the altitude of 'base plus ten'. In order to keep the bad guys guessing, actual altitudes are never used. Instead the freq card includes the base altitude for the day...today it is 10,000'. Dodge then adds 10 to that altitude and continues his climb to 20,000 feet.

Meanwhile, Wolf flight is looking hard into their radars. Another Bogey Dope call to Red Crown confirms that the MiGs are still chasing the F-105s. The F-4 flight breaks radar lock on Dodge and focus their radars on Red Crown's last bandit position.

The GIB in the backseat of #2 is a grizzled old major on his second tour. He's flying with Lt Fuzz, who has been in country for three weeks. A former Bear, the GIB talks reassuringly to his inexperienced front seater as he works the gain control to fine tune out the ground return while slowly adjusting the elevation. "Gotcha!", he mutters as he moves the range gate over the return slowly emerging out of the clutter. (Tour-tour of duty in the war...usually a year. In Country-assigned to a base in Southeast Asia. Bear-a backseater in a Wild Weasel...usually carries around his family jewels in a wheel barrow. Gain and elevation-adjustments to the radar picture...the GIB is tuning out the static caused by the ground returns...a skill that comes only from years of experience. Range gate-the lock on symbol on the radar scope.)

...........

When we last saw Wolf flight, they were about to engage a flight of MiGs that were chasing down some F-105s. In the coming engagement, please note the attention given to which flight member is attacking and which is defending. In the real world, air combat procedures include something called "The Engaged Fighter/Supporting Fighter Contract". This contract is a set of rules and procedures that govern how a flight deconflicts itself when maneuvering against one or more bandits. It turns out that the "furball" that you all have heard of is a bit more structured than it may at first seem. Here in very abbreviated form are the essentials of that contract:

1. Once the flight comes into contact with the enemy, the traditional leader/wingman relationship is set aside for the duration of the engagement. It is replaced with the concept of "engaged/supporting" fighters. In years past, this was known as the "engaged/free" contract.. The word "free" was deemed too representative of undisciplined flying and was changed to "supporting". Very PC!! Basically, the engaged fighter is the pilot that is either attacking or under attack. The supporting fighter is the pilot that at the moment is neither attacking or defending.

2. These roles are assigned as the fight develops. The leader never loses control of his flight, but he does give the wingman a certain amount of freedom to make on-the-spot tactical decisions. Because of the time compressed environment of modern air combat, decision time is measured in seconds.

Often, the rapidly developing nature of an engagement requires an immediate decision by the flight member seeing the threat. This may be the wingman. He may find himself in position to attack (or defend) and sees that he must react first and talk second. If this happens, the wingman becomes "engaged" and the leader, by definition, takes up the "supporting" role. The wingman remains "engaged" until the bandit is disposed of or the leader re-asserts his ultimate authority and calls the wingman off.

3. The engaged fighter has the responsibility of killing the bandit or maneuvering such that he himself is not killed. He is only responsible for keeping the bandit in sight...no one else.

4. The supporting fighter on the other hand MUST keep both the bandit and the engaged fighter in sight. The supporting fighter maneuvers to gain a position of kill on the bandit, but NEVER loses sight of the engaged fighter when doing so. Violation of this rule invites a mid-air between the two fighters. In case anyone doubts this, I have a story to tell you sometime (see the first column!)

So much for the guts of the relationship between the flight members...let's get back to business here with Wolf flight. To quickly recap, Wolf flight is sweeping the six o'clock of Dodge flight as that flight of F-105s is trying to reach the tanker. The backseater in Wolf 21 has the first radar contact.

"Wolf 21 has a contact on the nose for 20, low, 180 out". At the same time, Red Crown calls out, "Wolf, two Blue bandits at your 12, 20 nauticals". Wolf leader gets a quick call out, "Wolf 20, contact, Judy; Wolf kick it out. Check master arm on." Lead has acknowledged the bandits, reported a radar contact at that location, and taken responsibility for the intercept(Judy). He tells his formation to loosen up(kick it out) and reminds everyone to arm up their weapons. #3 reports a contact also while #4, with his radar T/U, hangs on for dear life.

It's a typical cloudy day as the two opposing flights hurtle towards each other. While the clouds don't affect the radar, it certainly cuts down on visual detection. Today's ROE require a visual ID of the target, so a face shot is out of the question. Lead has to get his act squared away, and he needs to do it fast.

"Three, hold high and clear our 12. Two, eyeball/shooter, #1 shooter;call your lock". Lead wants the second element to continue to sweep for more bandits...he does not want them engaging the two known bandits..instead they should continue to monitor Red Crown for additional threats. Lead tells #2 to fly the eyeball/shooter formation in the eyeball position, and he wants #2 to report a radar lock on.

Wolf 21's front seater has his heart in his throat and can't even get a squeak out. Not to worry. His GIB has seen all of this before. He makes the call, "Two's locked, visual, no tally". The lead now knows that #2 has a good lock and sees him, but not the bandit. The lead has known #2's GIB for years and trusts him to run a perfect intercept...his own GIB is also a new guy and is a bit behind events as they rapidly unfold.

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