Martuba was a complex of airbases that was home to several Italian Gruppos of Macchi 202s and the fearsome German Jagdgeschwader-27 "Wustengeschwader" (Desert Wing). A Geschwader was roughly equivalent to a British Wing and was composed of three Gruppen, rough equivalents of Squadrons, in all about 90 aircraft.

The great German ace Leutnant Hans-Joachim Marseille (right above), at that time an "experten" with 52 confirmed victories, was among them, and would eventually account for many of their losses. Other major aces in JG-27 were Obfw Otto Schultz with 46 victories and Oberleutnant Gustav Rodel (on left) with 32 victories.

The raid was to be carried out by 12 Bostons of the SAAF escorted by Kittyhawks from 94 and 260 Sqdns. It was Eddie's first operational sortie. They approached the airfield flying parallel to the coast so they had a clear point of reference to avoid getting lost over the desert. In short order they were over the enemy airfield at 10,000 feet. The first three Bostons went down in flames from intense Flak. Then the Me-109s attacked from below, up through the squadrons. The bombers unloaded over the base, dropped their noses to gain speed and turned for home.

Eddie was concentrating on following his leader when a Messerschmitt popped up in front of his Kittyhawk. Instantly he pressed the firing button and his six .50 caliber machine guns blew the enemy plane apart. Quickly, he tried to locate his leader but saw instead another German fighter firing at him. He pushed the stick far forward as cannon shells passed over his cockpit. He half-rolled his fighter and headed for the deck while trying in vain to spot a friendly fighter. Eddie followed the coast until he located a known position. Now all he had to do was find his base. But where was it?

The Germans produced an incredible number of Fliegerabwehrkanone or "Flak" guns to protect their troops in the field and eventually to provide a moderately effective system of radar directed Flak and searchlight systems to protect their major industrial cities, in particular those of the Ruhr valley.

In severe contrast to the normal scenery, was the desert floor. Seen from above, it offered no evidence of habitation or life. There were shades of sand, brown and darker spots or lines were intermixed and, to the novice, it was described as the "bundoo". There was nothing of note for miles in the vastness below. Some pilots had more trouble than others finding their way around; novices could be right over an airfield and not recognise anything at first glance. Then, the sun would glitter off an aircraft perspex or something else on the ground, and the entire camp would come into focus. It would become obvious an airstrip lay in the centre. Then there was the blinding sunlight of the desert.

"Sometimes annoying, sometimes a hindrance, it was helpful when attacking or navigating. The desert was the sun. It was common practice to go down on the deck sixty to eighty miles from home base and, with the aid of a compass or directional gyro aligned with the position of the sun, set course and arrive over our field. The sun was an important factor in all navigation and operational flying in the desert."

He eventually found the base by following his excellent sense of location and timing. The raid turned out to be a fairly successful one as experience would show. Unfortunately, the bombers made the mistake of flying at 6,000 feet, the perfect altitude for light Flak, and they lost three, as well as a Kittyhawk pilot for two Me-109s destroyed and one damaged. They came off lucky. The Wing Commander nicknamed Jim "the Hawk of Martuba" for his shooting that day. It was to be prophetic.

Operations were constant, roughly every second day 94 and 260 Sqdns escorted bombers of the SAAF. They frequently lost pilots and every trip saw more damage on the Kittyhawks from fighters and Flak. The Me-109s were in constant flight over Martuba and had the upper hand by flying higher than the Kittyhawks. They would dive on the Allied bombers and fighters and zoom up to regain altitude, position themselves and dive again. Generally, they contented themselves with shooting down the escort fighters, rarely penetrating the layers of Kittyhawks to get at the bombers.

Operations became a continuous series of fast passes, and quick shots. For several days Allied fighters and bombers kept the Martuba base hopping to distract German aerial attention away from an Allied convoy heading from Alexandria to Malta. It would be one of the last successful convoys to Malta for some time. The Allies also kept standing patrols over the strategically important area outside of Tobruk called El Adem. It would later become a hotly contested piece of desert by the armored columns of both sides.

Edwards and his leader had another close brush with the Germans of JG-27 when they were bounced on an escort mission. His leader turned them into the attack just right so they both fired at an approaching Messerschmitt. It exploded in a ball of flame and fell to the desert. Eddie didn't claim a partial as he was sure his leader had hit it. He found that close escort on bombers was more frustrating than flying in the upper or middle layers of the protective escort fighters. He champed on the bit when their Kittyhawks in the top-cover were dog-fighting with Germans and all he could do was fly his position and watch the action.

"It might have been a little safer from the 109's than flying top cover, but it gave me the jitters. I felt helpless because I couldn't do anything. But, that's what the air force calls discipline, or formation discipline - doing what you are told to do and not what you would like to do."

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Curtis P40 Kittyhawk

"I never thought much of being anywhere else. In fact, I was having the time of my life. Little things didn't matter; only the important things counted. Uniforms and parades were unheard of and not necessary. Only rank insignias were worn with any regularity. There was no such thing as a social function or party or special gathering that might pro rate anyone's rank or position."

When he wasn't on flight duty he practiced "shadow firing". He flew south of the base for several miles and found an unused area. At low level he flew parallel to the sun so that the plane's shadow was on his wing tip. When he turned towards the shadow it moved forward. He would then lay off some deflection and fire. If he used the correct deflection his bullets would hit the shadow on the desert floor. This also developed his ability to fly low and fast and not become mesmerized by the ground. He also had to concentrate on firing and to always keep a lookout for enemy aircraft. The WC also took them up to practice the finger four formation with two lead aircraft being followed by two wingmen. This was learned from the basic German formation called a Schwarm, and is still in use by fighter pilots.

Despite training courses their losses continued to be heavy, although not much heavier than other Kittyhawk/Tomahawk squadrons. On May 9, 94 Squadron received a shock. They were posted to the Nile Delta, the backwater of the war. They handed over their Kittyhawks and were ordered out of the western desert, except for Edwards and six others who showed some promise. They were ordered to cross the airfield and join 260 Squadron. It didn't seem to be any better than 94 Sqdn. as their operations were one shambles after another.

"260 still flew the stupid Hurricane formation with six aircraft in a flight. There were three section leaders and three weavers flying behind. Everyone looked after their own tails and no one coordinated anything when the 109's showed up. It seemed that everyone was for himself and the weavers had a hell of a time trying to keep up with their leader while weaving and watching behind. As a defensive formation, it was a confused glob of aircraft that could be turned into a confused shambles by a small number of 109's attacking from above, out of the sun. No wonder the 109's shot down so many! With their superior speed and height, the Messerschmitts had the superior initiative to engage or disengage at will."

He had the distinct impression that the Kittyhawks were there just to divert the German's attention from the bombers. When the 109s attacked it became every man for himself. In order to combat the 109s they had to turn in to the attacker, but to do so was to isolate oneself from the Squadron. No one came to your aid. But in 260 Sqdn. no one ever discussed tactics to more effectively combat the Germans. It drove him to distraction, he could see that they needed tactics and practice, but as a Flight Sergeant he was too low down the pecking order in the Squadron to be able to do anything about it.

From February to mid-May, 1942 a lull existed in the western desert as both sides renewed their strength, received more tanks and men and built up stores for a renewed offensive in June. The Desert Air Force consisted of only 320 aircraft, with only some 200 operating in the Tobruk and front-line areas. Facing them were just over 700 Axis aircraft, 500 of which were in the operational area, with a slight preponderance of Italians over Germans. Rommel was planning a knock-out blow to General Ritchie's 8th Army. Ritchie on the other hand was planning his static box formations around Tobruk as a base for further operations.

"Eddie" had joined 260 Squadron just as Rommel was kicking off his last major offensive of the desert war. 260 Squadron were posted to Gasr El Arid, south of Gambut, about 20 miles from Tobruk and 30 from the front. On the evening of May 25 a large German air raid on Gasr El Arid intending to knock out as many of the RAF planes as possible, started Rommel's "Operation Theseus". The next day saw a series of large duels in the air with the Luftwaffe generally coming out ahead. Rommel's troops moved forward the night of May 26 in long columns. The Italians attacked Ritchie's troops around the coastal road as a diversion while Rommel and much of the German armour headed south in an end-run of the English positions.

The German Panzers hit them hard from the flank at Bir Hacheim and got behind their west-facing formations. The Desert Air Force was tasked with intercepting and destroying as many armoured vehicles as possible. This left the Kittyhawks open to attacks from the Axis fighters and they paid heavily in downed aircraft. Eddie didn't see action until May 29 when Rommel had halted his troop's initial foray and regrouped them in an area to be called the "cauldron". 260 Sqdn. escorted Boston bombers on a raid to the area. He took up number two position in the flight behind the bombers.

The first group of armour they came upon didn't return the machine gun fire from the bombers so they assumed they were Allies (it was difficult to tell one column from another from the air). Another four miles on a concentrated column of vehicles started shooting at them so the South African bombers let them have it. Eddie could see the bombs exploding in and around the column with pretty good effect. The bombers put their noses down for speed, with the Kittyhawks following them closely. As usual 109s and Macchi 202s attacked from above. Eddie banked right and put some bullets into the nearest 109 with little obvious effect. The entire Squadron did little better, with two pilots killed, one was the WingCo, for only two damaged Axis aircraft.

Air raids were continuous night and day on the airfields. The ground crew and off-duty pilots had everything loaded into the Squadron trucks, ready to evacuate at a moments notice should the Africakorps break through the 8th Army stronghold of Gazala. The Luftwaffe was trying hard to snuff them out.

Watch for part 3 in this five part series...